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Essays on Unconventional Monetary Policy
Abstract
This dissertation studies the Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policy tools: the large-scale asset
purchases (LSAPs) and the extended period of a near-zero interest rate policy (ZIRP).
In the first chapter, we simulate the Federal Reserve second LSAPs program in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with bond market segmentation estimated on U.S. data. GDP growth increases by
less than a third of a percentage point and inflation barely changes relative to the absence of intervention. The
key reasons behind our findings are small estimates for both the elasticity of the risk premium to the quantity
of long-term debt and the degree of financial market segmentation. Absent the commitment to keep the
nominal interest rate at its lower bound for an extended period, the effects of asset purchase programs would
be even smaller.
The second chapter studies the effects of the LSAPs and ZIRP in DSGE models from a broader and deeper
perspective. LSAPs are ineffective (neutral operations) in standard DSGE models, and standard DSGE
models forecast an increase in interest rates immediately after the recent recession, contradictory to the ZIRP
conducted by the Federal Reserve. I study two mechanisms for breaking LSAPs' neutrality as in Chen, Curdia,
and Ferrero (2012) and Harrison (2010) and two methods of modeling the ZIRP: the perfect foresight
rational expectations model and the Markov regime-switching model which I develop. In this regime-
switching model, in one regime, the policy follows a Taylor rule, while, in the other regime, it involves a zero
interest rate. I also construct the optimal filter to estimate this regime-switching DSGE model with Bayesian
methods. I simulate the U.S. economy and compare the predicted paths of the macro variables with and
without the policy intervention. I find that the sole LSAPs intervention has an insignificant effect. Both
regime-switching model and the perfect foresight model imply a substantial stimulative effect of ZIRP.
However, the actual path is closer to the predicted path of the regime-switching model.
The third chapter further uses VARs that relax the DSGE model restrictions to examine the reason for the
small effects of LSAPs measured in the DSGE models.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY
Han Chen
Frank Schorfheide
This dissertation studies the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy tools:
the large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) and the extended period of a near-zero interest
rate policy (ZIRP).
In the first chapter, we simulate the Federal Reserve second LSAPs program in
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with bond market segmen-
tation estimated on U.S. data. GDP growth increases by less than a third of a
percentage point and inflation barely changes relative to the absence of intervention.
The key reasons behind our findings are small estimates for both the elasticity of the
risk premium to the quantity of long-term debt and the degree of financial market
segmentation. Absent the commitment to keep the nominal interest rate at its lower
bound for an extended period, the effects of asset purchase programs would be even
smaller.
The second chapter studies the effects of the LSAPs and ZIRP in DSGE models
from a broader and deeper perspective. LSAPs are ineffective (neutral operations) in
standard DSGE models, and standard DSGE models forecast an increase in interest
rates immediately after the recent recession, contradictory to the ZIRP conducted by
the Federal Reserve. I study two mechanisms for breaking LSAPs’ neutrality as in
Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Harrison (2010) and two methods of modeling
the ZIRP: the perfect foresight rational expectations model and the Markov regime-
switching model which I develop. In this regime-switching model, in one regime, the
policy follows a Taylor rule, while, in the other regime, it involves a zero interest rate.
iv
I also construct the optimal filter to estimate this regime-switching DSGE model with
Bayesian methods. I simulate the U.S. economy and compare the predicted paths of
the macro variables with and without the policy intervention. I find that the sole
LSAPs intervention has an insignificant effect. Both regime-switching model and the
perfect foresight model imply a substantial stimulative effect of ZIRP. However, the
actual path is closer to the predicted path of the regime-switching model.
The third chapter further uses VARs that relax the DSGE model restrictions to
examine the reason for the small effects of LSAPs measured in the DSGE models.
v
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Preface
In response to the 2008-2009 financial crisis, economic recession, and the weak recov-
ery that followed, the Federal Reserve has been giving the economy unprecedented
support: the federal funds rate has been kept close to zero since late 2008, and
the Federal Reserve has launched four rounds of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs)
(also known as “Quantitative Easing” (QE) by the financial community and finan-
cial media). The Federal Reserve purchased a total of $1.75 trillion in agency debt,
mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury notes starting in December 2008, followed
by a second $600 billion Treasury-only program in the fall of 2010. An additional
$400 billion “Operation Twist” program was announced in September of 2011. This
program was a pure swap between short-term and long-term assets, and it did not
create additional reserves. “QE3” was announced on September 13, 2012. The Fed-
eral Reserve has pledged to purchase $40 billion monthly of agency mortgage-backed
securities in an open-ended commitment in hopes of lowering the unemployment rate
while maintaining extraordinarily low rate policy, which I refer to as zero interest rate
policy (ZIRP), until“at least mid-2015.” “QE4”was announced on December 12, 2012.
The Federal Reserve is going to continue buying $40 billion monthly of agency-backed
mortgage securities while using $45 billion monthly created reserves to purchase inter-
mediate and long term Treasury notes until unemployment falls to 6.5%.1 Bernanke
1The Bank of England also set up an asset purchases facility in early 2009, and has bought £375
billion assets ($600 billion) at the time of writing. The European Central Bank purchased e60
xv
and Reinhart (2004) refer to both the asset purchases and the commitment to keep
interests low (forward guidance) as “unconventional monetary policy,” because con-
ventional monetary policy refers to the manipulation by the central bank of the policy
rate, which is the federal funds rate in the United States. Standard DSGE models
designed to analyze monetary policy and match the macro data well before the crises
must address the challenge of evaluating the Federal Reserve’s unconventional policy.
There are two main issues.
The first issue is that asset purchases are completely ineffective (neutral oper-
ations) in the baseline New Keynesian model of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Market participants take full advantage of arbitrage opportunities, thus LSAPs should
have no effect on real economic outcomes. The LSAPs’ neutrality result only depends
on two postulates: All investors can sell and buy the same assets at the same market
prices, and assets are only valued for their pecuniary returns. In order for LSAPs to
have a real effect, a natural starting point is to break either one of these postulates.
Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012) introduce financial market segmentation to break
the first postulate, which implies that the long-term interest rate matters for aggre-
gate demand distinctly from the expectation of short-term rates. Some households
are constrained in the sense that they can only invest the long-term bonds. In this
world, asset purchases that successfully reduce the yield on long-term bonds should
tilt the consumption profile of the constrained households towards the present and
stimulate investment. This will have a positive consequence for both output and
inflation. Harrison (2010)2 assumes bonds-in-utility to break the second postulate.
Since bonds directly enter agents’ Euler equation, central banks’ asset purchases pro-
gram affects agents’ consumption choice, and thus aggregate output and inflation, by
billion ($80 billion) of the Euro area covered bonds (a form of corporate bonds). The bank of Japan
has expanded its asset purchases program to a total of U55 trillion ($696 billion).
2Both Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Harrison (2010) are some variation of Andre´s,
Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2004).
xvi
affecting the quantity of outstanding long-term bonds.
The second issue is that since December of 2008, the U.S. federal funds rate has
been effectively zero. Standard DSGE models assume a Taylor rule, which often
predicts a quick rise of interest rates immediately after a recession.3 When analyzing
the effects of the policy of keeping the interest rates extremely low for an extended
period, the standard approach is to estimate a stochastic model and then conduct
a counterfactual analysis using the perfect foresight rational expectations (PFRE)
model (Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011)).4 This method assumes that agents have perfect
foresight of the path of future shocks and the interest rates, and rational expectations
equilibrium can be solved backwards. The policy analysis (assuming perfect foresight)
inherently conflicts with the assumption of the stochastic model that is used to fit the
data. Furthermore, the PFRE model predicts an unrealistic path of macro variables.
For example, this model predicts a spurious rise in inflation5.
In this work, I study two types of DSGE models that break the neutrality of LSAPs
as in Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012) and Harrison (2010) and two methods of mod-
eling the ZIRP in DSGE models: the PFRE model and the regime-switching model
I develop in chapter 2 in order to better predict the distribution of macroeconomic
variables. I found that the effects of the LSAPs alone are insignificant measured in
the DSGE models, while the ZIRP has a substantial effect and crucially depends on
the models. I argue that the regime-switching model is more appropriate to analyze
the effects of ZIRP because it generates more realistic predicted path of macro vari-
ables than PFRE model. The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 1, Chen,
Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2012), studies the effects of the Federal Reserve’s second round
3Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Chung, Laforte, Reifschneider, and Williams (2011), and
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2012).
4A detailed description can be found in the AppendixA.
5Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2012) interpret the explosive dynamics as a failure of New
Keynesian monetary DSGE models, and Blake (2012) shares this sentiment.
xvii
large-scale asset purchase program by assuming market segmentation and a transient
zero-interest-rate peg. Chapter 2 further studies the macroeconomic effects of asset
purchases with the Harrison (2010) specification, develops a Markov regime-switching
monetary policy rule to study the effects of an extended period of zero interest rates,
and constructs the optimal filter to estimate this regime-switching DSGE model with
Bayesian methods. I fit those modified DSGE models to the U.S. data and simulate
the U.S. economy with and without the policy interventions. I compare the predictive
paths of the macro variables through cross-assessment of the different models. Chap-
ter 3 uses vector autoregressions (VARs) that relax the DSGE model restrictions to
examine the reason for the small effects of LSAPs measured in the DSGE models.
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Chapter 1
The Macroeconomic Effects of
Large-Scale Asset Purchase
Programs
This chapter was prepared for the conference “Learning the Lessons from QE and
Other Unconventional Monetary Policies,” that took place at the Bank of England
on November 17-18, 2011. This chapter was coauthored with Vasco Cu´rdia (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York) and Andrea Ferrero (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
and published in the Economic Journal November 2012 .
1.1 Introduction
The objective of the various LSAP programs, often referred to as “Quantitative Eas-
ing”(or QE), is to support aggregate economic activity in periods when the traditional
instrument of monetary policy (the short-term nominal interest rate) is not available
due to the zero bound constraint. The general idea is that asset purchases operate
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directly on different segments of the yield curve, reducing rates at different maturities
while the short-term rate is at zero.
Several papers find evidence that LSAP programs have indeed been effective in
reducing long-term rates. For example, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011)
estimate that the first round of asset purchases by the Federal Reserve lowered the
ten-year Treasury yield by 58 basis points (bp).6
Yet, agreement on the effectiveness of LSAP programs in supporting the macroe-
conomy is far from universal. From a theoretical perspective, LSAP programs were
criticized before their implementation, based on some version of the irrelevance result
in Wallace (1981). Quantitative easing of this type is also completely ineffective in the
baseline New Keynesian model of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). In this frame-
work, injecting reserves in exchange for longer term securities is a neutral operation.
To the extent that market participants take full advantage of arbitrage opportuni-
ties, LSAP programs should have no effect on real economic outcomes. Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2011) extend this result to a New Keynesian model with credit frictions.
If households perceive the assets purchased (such as short-term government bonds) as
equivalent to reserves, again LSAP programs have no effect on the macroeconomy.7
Ex-post, the criticism has continued due to the difficulty of identifying empirically the
effects of asset purchases from other macroeconomic forces (e.g. Cochrane (2011)).
In this paper, we estimate the effects of LSAP on macroeconomic variables in a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with segmented asset markets.
6A selected sample of other estimates include 13 bp in Hamilton and Wu (2010), 39 bp in Doh
(2010), 45 bp in D’Amico and King (2010), and 107 bp in Neely (2010). Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) find that LSAP II reduced the ten-year yield by about 16 bp. See more details in
Table 1.1.
7Asset purchase programs may be an effective tool to boost the economy if the government buys
securities that are not equivalent to reserves, either because not all households can invest in those
assets or because financial frictions impair investment. Recent research along these lines, such as
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011), Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011) and Gertler and
Karadi (2011), has mostly focused on private credit markets. Here, instead, we study frictions that
rationalize a role for government purchases of long-term bonds.
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General equilibrium effects are at the heart of Wallace’s irrelevance theorem. By going
beyond the effects of asset purchases on interest rates, we can evaluate the extent of
the criticisms against this type of programs. At the same time, we want to give LSAP
programs a chance. We introduce limits to arbitrage and market segmentation in a
simple form that encompasses frictionless financial markets. Therefore, our strategy
is to identify the degree of segmentation—and ultimately the effectiveness of asset
purchases on macroeconomic activity—directly from the data, without assuming a
priori that LSAP programs are bound to fail.
To implement this approach, we augment a standard DSGE model with nomi-
nal and real rigidities, along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007), with segmented bond markets. In particular, we
follow Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2004)(henceforth ALSN) and assume that
investors have heterogeneous preferences for assets of different maturities (a“preferred
habitat” motive, similar to Vayanos and Vila (2009)). We do not model the details of
why assets of different maturities are imperfect substitutes. Rather, we postulate that
this type of market segmentation exists and estimate the importance of this friction
for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The form of asset market segmentation that we use in this paper implies that the
long-term interest rate matters for aggregate demand distinctly from the expectation
of short-term rates. In this world, even if the short-term rate is constrained by the
zero lower bound (ZLB) for a long period of time, monetary policy can still be effective
by directly influencing current long-term rates. In addition, we assume that the risk
premium that arises in the model as a consequence of transaction costs is a positive
function of the supply of long-term Treasury securities. This assumption captures, in
reduced form, the notion that asset purchase programs are most effective in flattening
the yield curve by reducing the risk premium (Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack
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(2011)).
We estimate the model on U.S. data with standard Bayesian methods for the
post-war sample, including the recent years. Our main experiment is a counter-
factual evaluation of what would have happened to output, inflation and the other
macroeconomic variables in the absence of LSAP programs.8
First, we calibrate the size of the asset purchase program to match a $600 billion
reduction of long-term debt in the hands of the private sector, as announced in the
U.S. at the time of LSAP II. At the same time, we consider that the central bank
announces the commitment to hold the interest rate at the ZLB for four quarters.9
The posterior median effect on GDP growth is an increase of 0.13% (annualized),
while the posterior median inflation increase is 3 bp (annualized). The corresponding
effect on the level of GDP is estimated to be very long lasting—six years after the
start of the program the level of GDP is still 0.07% above the path that would have
prevailed in the absence of the LSAP program.
Counterfactual simulations suggest that the commitment to hold the short-term
nominal interest rate at the ZLB increases the response of real activity and inflation
roughly by factors of three and two, respectively, and introduces upward skewness in
the uncertainty surrounding the median estimates. Furthermore, the boost from the
commitment to the ZLB is increasingly larger with the length of such a commitment.
Overall, in our model, the effects of LSAP II are slightly smaller—and considerably
more uncertain—than a 25 bp cut in the short-term rate.
These results suggest that the effects of LSAP programs on macroeconomic vari-
ables, such as GDP and inflation, are likely to be modest. In the technical appendix,
8These simulations present us with the key challenge of incorporating the zero bound of nominal
interest rates. We deal with this problem using the techniques developed in Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2011).
9This assumption is consistent with the “extended period” language in the FOMC statements at
the time of LSAP II and the market expectations as implied in surveys of private forecasters.
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we consider several robustness exercises and find that the effects on GDP growth are
unlikely to exceed a third of a percentage point. The inflationary consequences of
asset purchase programs are consistently very small throughout all scenarios consid-
ered. As a comparison, using the FRB/US model, Chung, Laforte, Reifschneider, and
Williams (2011) find that LSAP II induced a reduction in the risk premium of only
20 bp but increased the level of GDP by about 0.6% and the inflation rate by 0.1%.
Baumeister and Benati (2010), using a VAR with time-varying coefficients, consider a
change in the term premium of 60 bp and estimate a median increase in GDP growth
of 3% and on inflation of 1%. Our results are therefore more moderate than in the
existing literature, especially compared to the VAR methodology. Importantly, our
results only touch upon the positive dimension of LSAP programs. Harrison (2010)
evaluates the macroeconomic consequences of the optimal amount of asset purchases
in a version of this model without capital. His findings are consistent with ours in
the sense that asset purchases can improve aggregate welfare, but their quantitative
relevance appears to be limited.
Our results do not depend on whether asset purchases are financed via reserves
or sales of short-term debt, to the extent that these two assets are close to perfect
substitutes. Therefore, according to our model, the effects of the Federal Reserve’s
last round of asset purchases (also known as “Operation Twist Again”) should be in
line with the estimates from LSAP II after controlling for the scale factor and for any
differences in the duration of the commitment to the zero interest rate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 1.3 discusses the data, the estimation of the model, some basic analysis of
parameter estimates, and an evaluation of how the model explains the level and slope
of the term structure of interest rates. We discuss the LSAP simulation in Section 1.4.
Finally, section 1.5 concludes. The companion technical appendix presents additional
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details on the model equations and steady state, data, implementation of the zero
lower bound commitment, additional robustness exercises, some diagnostics on shock,
and variance analysis with respect to the components of the yield curve.
1.2 Model
Two types of households, unrestricted (denoted by u) and restricted (denoted by
r), populate the economy and supply differentiated labor inputs. Competitive labor
agencies combine these inputs into a homogeneous composite. Competitive capital
producers transform the consumption good into capital. Monopolistic competitive
firms hire the labor composite and rent capital to produce intermediate goods. Com-
petitive final goods producing firms package intermediate goods into a homogeneous
consumption good. Finally, the government sets monetary and fiscal policy.
1.2.1 Households
The key modification relative to a standard medium-scale DSGE model (Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005); Smets and Wouters (2007)) is the introduction of
segmentation and transaction costs in bond markets, as in ALSN.
A continuum of measure one of households populate the economy. Household
j = u, r enjoys consumption Cjt (relative to productivity Zt, as in An and Schorfheide
(2007a) and dislikes hours worked Ljt .
10 Households supply differentiated labor inputs
indexed by i but perfectly share consumption risk within each group. The life-time
10We express utility as a function of de-trended consumption to ensure the existence of a balanced
growth path with constant relative risk aversion preferences. Imposing log-utility of consumption
may be an excessively restrictive assumption in our model which is mainly concerned about asset
pricing.
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utility function for a generic households j is
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsj b
j
t+s
 1
1− σj
(
Cjt+s
Zt+s
− hC
j
t+s−1
Zt+s−1
)1−σj
− ϕ
j
t+s(L
j
t+s(i))
1+ν
1 + ν
 , (1.1)
where βj ∈ (0, 1) is the individual discount factor, bjt is a preference shock, σj > 0 is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, h ∈ (0, 1) is the habit parameter, ν ≥ 0 is the
inverse elasticity of labor supply and ϕjt is a labor supply shock.
11 The preference
and labor supply shocks both follow stationary AR(1) processes in logs.
Two types of bonds exist. Short-term bonds Bt are one-period securities purchased
at time t that pay a nominal return Rt at time t + 1. Following Woodford (2001),
long-term bonds are perpetuities that cost PL,t at time t and pay an exponentially
decaying coupon κs at time t + s + 1, for κ ∈ (0, 1].12 We abstract from money and
consider the limit of a cashless economy as in Woodford (1998).
The fraction ωu of unrestricted households trade in both short-term and long-
term government bonds. Unrestricted households, however, pay a transaction cost
ζt per-unit of long-term bond purchased. This transaction cost is paid to a financial
intermediary as a fee for its service. The financial intermediary distributes its profits,
whose per-capita nominal value is Pfit , as dividends to all shareholders (regardless of
type). The remaining fraction of the population ωr = 1 − ωu consists of restricted
households who only trade in long-term bonds but pay no transaction costs.13
The flow budget constraint differs depending on whether the household belongs
to the unrestricted or restricted group. For an unrestricted household that can trade
11We allow for heterogeneity in preference shocks, discount factors and coefficient of relative risk
aversions because these factors affect the household’s consumption-saving decisions and financial
market segmentation directly influences these optimality conditions. As such, this heterogeneity can
potentially influence the simulation results in a substantial way.
12If κ = 1, this security is a consol.
13We discuss in more details the implications of transaction costs and bond market segmentation
in sections 1.2.6 and 1.2.6 below.
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both short and long-term bonds, we have
PtC
u
t +B
u
t +(1+ζt)PL,tB
L,u
t ≤ Rt−1But−1+
∞∑
s=1
κs−1BL,ut−s+W
u
t (i)L
u
t (i)+Pt+Pcpt +Pfit −T ut .
(1.2)
For a restricted household that can only trade in long-term securities but does not
pay transaction costs, we have
PtC
r
t + PL,tB
L,r
t ≤
∞∑
s=1
κs−1BL,rt−s +W
r
t (i)L
r
t (i) + Pt + Pcpt + Pfit − T rt . (1.3)
In equations (1.2) and (1.3), Pt is the price of the final consumption good, W
j
t (i) is
the wage set by a household of type j = {u, r} who supplies labor of type i, Pt and
Pcpt are profits from ownership of intermediate goods producers and capital producers
respectively, and T jt are lump-sum taxes.
14
One advantage of assuming that the entire stock of long-term government bonds
consists of perpetuities is that the price in period t of a bond issued s periods ago PL−s,t
is a function of the coupon and the current price, PL,t. In the technical appendix,
we show how we can write the budget constraints for the two types of households
recursively as a function of the price of the bond in period t and the yield to maturity
of the bond, RL,t.
Household j consumption-saving decisions are the result of the maximization of
(1.1) subject to (1.2) if j = u or (1.3) if j = r. See the technical appendix for details
and section 1.2.6 for some discussion.
14Each household receives the same dividend from intermediate goods and capital producers and
pays the same amount of lump-sum taxes.
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Labor Agencies and Wage Setting Decision
Perfectly competitive labor agencies combine differentiated labor inputs into a homo-
geneous labor composite Lt according to the technology
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
,
where λw ≥ 0 is the steady state wage markup.
Profit maximization gives the demand for the ith labor input
Lt(i) =
[
Wt(i)
Wt
]− 1+λw
λw
Lt. (1.4)
From the zero profit condition for labour agencies, we obtain an expression for the
aggregate wage index Wt as a function of the wage set by the i
th household
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
− 1
λw di
]−λw
.
Households are monopolistic suppliers of differentiated labor inputs Lt(i) and set
wages on a staggered basis (Calvo (1983)) taking the demand for their input as given.
In each period, the probability of resetting the wage is 1 − ζw, while with the com-
plementary probability the wage is automatically increased by the steady state rates
of inflation (Π) and of productivity growth (eγ),
W jt+s(i) = (Πe
γ)s W˜ jt (i), (1.5)
for s > 0, where W˜ jt (i) is the wage chosen at time t in the event of an adjustment. A
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household of type j that can reset the wage at time t chooses W˜ jt (i) to maximize
Et
∞∑
t=0
(βjζw)
s
[
Ξj,pt+s (Πe
γ)s W˜ jt (i)L
j
t+s(i)−
ϕjt+s(L
j
t+s(i))
1+ν
1 + ν
]
,
where Ξj,pt is the marginal utility of consumption in nominal terms, subject to (1.4)
and (1.5). The technical appendix presents the first order condition for this problem.
1.2.2 Capital Producers
Competitive capital producers make investment decisions, choose the utilization rate
and rent capital to intermediate good producing firms. By choosing the utilization
rate ut, capital producers end up renting in each period t an amount of “effective”
capital equal to
Kt = utK¯t−1,
Capital producers accumulate capital according to
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 + µt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It, (1.6)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate, µt is an investment-specific technology shock
that follows a stationary AR(1) process in logs and S(·) is the cost of adjusting
investment (with S ′(·) ≥ 0 and S ′′(·) > 0).15
Capital producers discount future profits at the marginal utility of the average
shareholder
Ξpt+s ≡ ωuβsuΞu,pt+s + ωrβsrΞr,pt+s.
This variable is the appropriate discount factor of future dividends because ownership
15Furthermore, we assume that S (eγ) = S′ (eγ) = 0.
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of capital producing firms is equally distributed among all households.16 Capital
producers maximize the expected discounted stream of dividends to their shareholders
Et
∞∑
s=0
Ξpt+s
[
Rkt+sut+sK¯t+s−1 − Pt+sa(ut+s)K¯t+s−1 − Pt+sIt+s
]
,
subject to the law of motion of capital (1.6), where Rkt is the return per unit of effective
capital. Note that we assume that utilization subtracts real resources measured in
terms of the consumption good, a(ut)K¯t−1.17
1.2.3 Final Goods Producers
Perfectly competitive final goods producers combine differentiated intermediate goods
Yt(f), supplied by a continuum of firms f of measure 1, into a homogeneous good Yt
according to the technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(f)
1
1+λf df
]1+λf
,
where λf ≥ 0 is the steady state price markup. The resulting demand for the f th
intermediate good is
Yt(f) =
[
Pt(f)
Pt
]− 1+λf
λf
Yt. (1.7)
From the zero profit condition for intermediate goods producers, we obtain an ex-
pression for the aggregate price index Pt as a function of the price set by the f
th
intermediate good producer
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(f)
− 1
λf df
]−λf
.
16The same consideration applies below to intermediate goods producers.
17As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), we choose an implicit functional form for
a(ut) such that u = 1 in steady state and a(1) = 0.
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1.2.4 Intermediate Goods Producers
A continuum of measure one of monopolistic competitive firms combine rented capital
and hired labor to produce intermediate goods according to a standard Cobb-Douglas
technology
Yt(f) = Kt(f)
α (ZtLt(f))
1−α , (1.8)
where Zt is a labor-augmenting technology process which evolves according to
log
(
Zt
Zt−1
)
= (1− ρz)γ + ρz log
(
Zt−1
Zt−2
)
+ z,t.
Cost minimization yields an expression for the marginal cost which only depends on
aggregate variables
MC(f)t = MCt =
(Rkt )
αW 1−αt
αα(1− α)1−αZ1−αt
. (1.9)
Intermediate goods producers set prices on a staggered basis (Calvo (1983)). In
each period, a firm can readjust prices with probability 1−ζp independently of previous
adjustments. We depart from the basic formulation of staggered price setting in
assuming the firms that cannot adjust in the current period index their price to the
steady state inflation rate Π. The problem for a firm that can adjust at time t is to
choose the price P˜t(f) that maximizes
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζspΞ
p
t+s
[
P˜t(f)Π
s − λf,t+sMCt+s
]
Yt+s(f),
subject to (1.7) conditional on no further adjustments after t, where λf,t is a goods
markup shock that follows a stationary AR(1) process in logs.
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1.2.5 Government Policies
The central bank follows a conventional feedback interest rate rule similar to Taylor
(1993), amended to include interest rate smoothing (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000))
and using the growth rate of output instead of the output gap (Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2011))
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρm [(Πt
Π
)φpi (Yt/Yt−4
e4γ
)φy]1−ρm
em,t ,
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation rate, ρm ∈ (0, 1), φpi > 1, φy ≥ 0 and m,t is an
i.i.d. innovation.18
The presence of long-term bonds modifies the standard government budget con-
straint
Bt + PL,tB
L
t = Rt−1,tBt−1 + (1 + κPL,t)B
L
t−1 + PtGt − Tt. (1.10)
The left-hand side of expression (1.10) is the market value, in nominal terms, of the
total amount of bonds (short-term and long-term) issued by the government at time
t. The right-hand side is the total deficit at time t, that is, the cost of servicing bonds
maturing in that period plus spending Gt net of taxes.
We assume that the government controls the supply of long-term bonds following
a simple autoregressive rule for their de-trended market value in real terms
PL,tB
L
t
PtZt
=
(
PL,t−1BLt−1
Pt−1Zt−1
)ρB
eB,t , (1.11)
where ρB ∈ (0, 1) and B,t is an i.i.d. exogenous shock. We interpret LSAP programs
18The presence of output growth, instead of the output gap, in the interest rate rule avoids the
complication of solving for and estimating the system of equations that characterize the flexible price
equilibrium of the model. In practice, GDP growth relative to trend is often cited as one of the main
indicators of real activity for the conduct of monetary policy.
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as shocks to the composition of outstanding government liabilities compared to the
historical behavior of these series.
Finally, the government adjusts the real primary fiscal surplus in response to the
lagged real value of long-term debt, as in Davig and Leeper (2006) and Eusepi and
Preston (2011),
Tt
PtZt
− Gt
Zt
= Φ
(
PL,t−1BLt−1
Pt−1Zt−1
)φT
eT,t , (1.12)
where φT > 0 and T,t follows a stationary AR(1) process. All fiscal variables in
rule (1.12) are cyclically adjusted (i.e. expressed relative to the level of productivity)
and the constant Φ is such that in steady state the fiscal rule is just an identity.
Note that the presence of asset market segmentation breaks Ricardian equivalence
in this model. Therefore, fiscal financing decisions have real consequences on the
allocation. Given a strong enough feedback (a high enough value of the coefficient
φT ), rule (1.12) ensures that the primary surplus adjusts to satisfy the government
intertemporal budget constraint.
1.2.6 Equilibrium and Solution Strategy
In equilibrium, households and firms maximize their objectives subject to their con-
straints and all markets clear. In particular, the resource constraint is
Yt = ωuC
u
t + ωrC
r
t + It +Gt + a(ut)K¯t−1.
We solve the model by taking a first-order log-linear approximation around a
steady state in which quantities are normalized by the level of productivity Zt and
relative prices are expressed as function of Pt. The technical appendix shows the
full set of non-linear normalized equilibrium relations, characterizes the steady state
solution, and presents the full set of log-linearized equations that constitute the basis
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for the estimation.
These conditions are standard in modern DSGE models (Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005); Smets and Wouters (2007)) with the exception of the households’
consumption-saving decisions. Here, we focus on these Euler equations to sharpen
the intuition about the effects of segmentation in the bond market. This discussion
should also clarify the channels through which asset purchase programs can support
macroeconomic outcomes.
Since only unrestricted households trade in short-term bonds, the pricing equation
for these securities is
1 = βuEt
[
e−γ−zt+1
Ξut+1
Ξut
Rt
Πt+1
]
, (1.13)
where Ξut is the marginal utility of de-trended consumption in real terms for an un-
restricted household and e−γ−zt+1 is the correction factor due to productivity growth.
Both unrestricted and restricted households trade long-term bonds. For unre-
stricted households, the pricing equation of these securities is
(1 + ζt) = βuEt
[
e−γ−zt+1
Ξut+1
Ξut
PL,t+1
PL,t
RL,t+1
Πt+1
]
. (1.14)
For constrained households, the pricing condition is
1 = βrEt
[
e−γ−zt+1
Ξrt+1
Ξrt
PL,t+1
PL,t
RL,t+1
Πt+1
]
. (1.15)
Restricted households have a different marginal utility of consumption and do not
pay the transaction cost.
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Transaction Costs and the Risk Premium
The presence of transaction costs for unrestricted households in the market for long-
term bonds gives rise to a risk premium. Using equation (1.14), we define REHL,t as
the counterfactual yield to maturity on a long-term bond at time t in the absence
of transaction costs, given the same path for the marginal utility of consumption of
unrestricted households. No arbitrage implies that this fictitious bond should have
the same risk-adjusted return as the long-term security actually traded. We measure
the risk premium as the difference between these two yields to maturity, up to a first
order approximation
RˆL,t − RˆEHL,t =
1
DL
∞∑
s=0
(
DL − 1
DL
)s
Etζt+s, (1.16)
where DL is the steady state duration of the two securities.
19 Expression (1.16) shows
that the risk premium in this economy equals the present discounted value of current
and expected future transaction costs.
In ALSN, the risk premium has two components, one endogenous and one exoge-
nous. The endogenous component arises because households face a portfolio adjust-
ment cost, function of the relative quantity of money relative to long-term assets. The
idea is that long-term bonds entail a loss of liquidity that households hedge by in-
creasing the amount of money in their portfolio. The transaction costs in the market
for long-term bonds are treated as purely exogenous.
We retain the distinction between endogenous and exogenous component of the
risk premium while abstracting from the portfolio adjustment cost component. In-
stead, we directly assume that transaction costs are function of the ratio of market
19The details of the derivation are in the technical appendix. In defining the yield to maturity of a
bond in the absence of transaction costs, we adjust the parameter κ to guarantee that the fictitious
security has the same steady state duration as the actual long-term bond.
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value of long-term debt to short-term debt in the hands of the public, plus an error
ζt ≡ ζ
(
PL,tB
L
z,t
Bz,t
, ζ,t
)
, (1.17)
where BLz,t ≡ BLt /(PtZt), and Bz,t ≡ Bt/(PtZt). We do not take a stand on the explicit
functional form of ζ(.). We only require the function and its first derivative to be posi-
tive when evaluated in steady state (i.e. ζ(PLB
L
z /Bz, 0) > 0 and ζ
′(PLBLz /Bz, 0) > 0).
The first assumption ensures the presence of a positive steady state risk premium, as
in the data. The second assumption guarantees that the yield on long-term bonds
drops following a reduction in their outstanding amount. This element gives LSAP
programs a chance to work through the mechanism identified in the reduced form
estimates (Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011)).
Up to a log-linear approximation, our parsimonious formulation of transaction
costs is observationally equivalent to the two frictions in ALSN. The idea that transac-
tion costs depend directly on the aggregate stock of bonds captures the same intuition
(i.e. a liquidity cost) of the adjustment cost function in the original formulation.20
Limits to Arbitrage
The assumption of market segmentation captures, in reduced form, the observation
that in reality some fraction of the population mostly saves through pension funds
and other types of long-term institutional investors. These financial intermediaries
are specialists in certain segments of the market and their transaction costs are likely
to be small. Conversely, households who invest in long-term bonds mostly for diver-
sification motives may face higher transaction costs.21 The parameter ωu measures
20An alternative approach to study the effects of LSAP programs on risk and term premia would
be to use higher order approximation methods and estimate the model with the particle filter (van
Binsbergen, Fernandez-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramirez (2010)).
21See ALSN for a more detailed discussion of this interpretation.
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this segmentation and is one of the key objects of interest in our estimation results.
The key implication of bond market segmentation is that not all agents in the
model can take full advantage of arbitrage opportunities. Unrestricted households
can arbitrage away, up to some transaction cost, differences in risk-adjusted expected
returns between short and long-term bonds (equations 1.13 and 1.14) but restricted
households do not have this possibility. Equation (1.15) fully characterizes the savings
behavior of restricted households.
This friction provides a rationale for asset purchase programs to influence macroe-
conomic outcomes, thus breaking the irrelevance result in Wallace (1981). In particu-
lar, in our model, a program targeted to purchases of long-term securities reduces the
risk premium (equation 1.17), changing their expected return. Absent segmentation,
this program would affect the yield to maturity of the long-term bond (equation 1.14)
but would have no effects on the real allocation. Because unrestricted households can
invest in both securities, their portfolios would adjust until the two expected returns
are equated again, implying a different yield to maturity on the long-term bond. In
equilibrium, expected returns, inclusive of transaction costs, would be unchanged,
hence avoiding any change of the stochastic discount factor. Thus, no real variable in
this economy is affected.
Conversely, with segmented bond markets, LSAP programs do affect the real econ-
omy. The change in long-term yields induces a change in the expected return of the
restricted households, which are not subject to the transaction costs. Because the
expected return is different from the restricted households’ perspective, their stochas-
tic discount factor has to adjust. This change alters their intertemporal profile of
consumption (equation 1.15) and indirectly influences both the pricing decisions of
intermediate producing firms and the investment decisions of capital producers. Ul-
timately, general equilibrium forces imply that consumption for both types of agents,
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investment and production respond as well.22 The simulations in section 1.4 illustrate
the magnitude of the LSAP stimulus on aggregate demand and inflation.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
We estimate the model with Bayesian methods, as surveyed for example by An and
Schorfheide (2007a). Bayesian estimation combines prior information on the param-
eters with the likelihood function of the model to form the posterior distribution.
We construct the likelihood using the Kalman filter based on the state space repre-
sentation of the rational expectations solution of the model.23 In the remainder of
this section, we first describe the data used and then present parameter prior and
posterior distributions.
1.3.1 Data
We use quarterly data for the United States from the third quarter of 1987 (1987q3) to
the third quarter of 2009 (2009q3) for the following seven series: real GDP per capita,
hours worked, real wages, core personal consumption expenditures deflator, nominal
effective Federal Funds rate, the 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield, and the
ratio between long-term and short-term U.S. Treasury debt.24 All data are extracted
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) maintained by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. In the technical appendix we describe more precisely how the data
is constructed and how it maps to the state variables in the model.
22In practice, another effect of asset purchase programs could be the incentive for households to
shift their portfolios toward riskier assets, such as equity and corporate bonds. In the model, this
mechanism is absent as the equity shares are non-tradable.
23We impose a zero posterior density for parameter values that imply indeterminacy, which is
equivalent to a truncation of the joint prior distribution.
24We use an extended sample, starting in 1959q3, to initialize the Kalman filter, but the likelihood
function itself is evaluated only for the period starting in 1987q3, conditional on the previous sample.
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1.3.2 Prior Choice
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 (columns two to five) summarize the prior distributions of each
parameter. We use a Gamma distribution for the parameters that economic theory
suggests should be positive to constrain their support on the interval [0,∞]. For those
parameters that span only the unit interval, we use the Beta distribution. For the
standard deviation of shock innovations, we use the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
The steady state value for inflation is centered at 2%, in line with the mandate-
consistent level of inflation commonly assigned to the Federal Open Market Commit-
tee (FOMC). The steady state growth rate is centered at 2.5% (annualized). The
discount factor has a prior that implies a real interest rate of about 2% (annualized).
The steady state spread between the 10-year treasury yield and the federal funds rate
has a prior centered at 0.75% (annualized), similar to the average in the data.
We follow Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) for the priors of standard parameters.
The investment adjustment cost convexity parameter S ′′ has prior mean of 4 and
standard deviation of 1. The utilization cost elasticity parameter a′′ has prior mean
0.2 and standard deviation 0.1, implying that in response to a 1% increase in the
return to capital, utilization rates rise by about 0.17%. We calibrate the share of
capital in production α to 0.33, and the capital depreciation rate δ to 2.5% per
quarter.
The habit formation coefficient for both types of agents has prior mean of 0.6 and
standard deviation 0.1, also fairly common in the literature. The parameter control-
ling the labor supply elasticity ν has a prior centered at 2. Similarly to Smets and
Wouters (2007), we estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consump-
tion for households, except that in our model we have two types of agents. The prior
on σu and σr is relatively flat (centered at 2 with standard deviation of 1) and equal
for both types, so that the data can be informative about their value.
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The fraction of unrestricted agents ωu is the crucial parameter to identify the
degree of bond market segmentation in the model. At the mean, our prior implies
that 70% of the households are unrestricted. As we show below, this degree of seg-
mentation, conditional on the rest of the priors, is consistent with substantial effects
of LSAP in the model. A standard deviation of 0.2, however, makes the distribution
flat enough that the 90% prior interval is (0.32,0.96) and encompasses very large to
minimal effects. The other key parameter is the elasticity of the risk premium to
changes in the market value of long debt ζ ′. The prior for this parameter has a mean
1.5/100 and a standard deviation big enough to match the range of estimates shown
in Table 1.1 (see discussion above). The cash-flow parameter that controls the dura-
tion of long-term bonds (given the yield to maturity) is calibrated to imply a duration
of 30 quarters, similar to the average duration in the secondary market for 10-year
U.S. Treasury bills. We consider short-term debt to include both government bonds
with less than one year to maturity as well as central bank liabilities in the form of
reserves, vault cash and deposits. In the U.S., the average for this quantity since 1974
is about 16% of annual GDP. For long-term bonds, we consider all government bonds
with maturity greater than one year, which in the U.S. is also about 16% of annual
GDP since 1974.
Table 1.2 contains three non-standard parameters (Ξu/Ξr, Cu/Cr, and χwu) which
refer to steady state ratios hard to pin down directly from the data. We decided not
to calibrate these ratios to avoid biasing the estimation and the simulations in either
direction. The posterior distribution for these three parameters turns out to deviate
negligibly from our prior. Furthermore, the uncertainty in these ratios translates into
uncertainty in the dynamics of the model and in the effects of asset purchases on
macroeconomic variables.
The priors for the wage and price rigidity parameters ζw and ζp are centered at
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0.5 with a standard deviation of 0.1, as in Smets and Wouters (2007). The fiscal rule
parameter, φT is centered at 1.5 and its posterior does not differ too much from the
prior. For the monetary policy rule, we consider fairly standard parameter priors.
The interest rate smoothing parameter ρr is centered at 0.7. The response to output
growth φy is centered at 0.4. The prior mean for the response to inflation φpi, centered
at 1.75, is slightly higher than the usual value of 1.5 in Taylor (1993). The 90% prior
interval, however, is completely above one, consistent with the Taylor principle.
The shocks follow AR(1) processes, with autocorrelation coefficient ρi centered
at 0.75, except for the autocorrelations of productivity shocks (equal to 0.4 so that
the growth rate shock is not too persistent) and of the risk premium and debt shocks
(equal to 0.8). The prior mean of the innovations have standard deviations σi centered
at 0.5, except for the innovation to the monetary policy shock and the risk premium
shock whose standard deviation is smaller because these variables refer to quarterly
changes in interest rates.
1.3.3 Parameter Posterior Distribution
In order to obtain the posterior distribution, we first obtain the posterior mode.25
We then use a normal approximation around the mode to form a jump distribution
to generate a sample of parameter vector draws representative of the posterior based
on the Metropolis random walk Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation
method.26 The last five columns of tables 1.2 and 1.3 report the posterior distribution
25We extract the mode by maximizing the posterior density function, which can be a very chal-
lenging task with a high-dimensional problem like the one in this paper. In order to reduce the
chances of extracting a local maximum, we perform 50 maximizations of the mode starting at dif-
ferent guesses of the parameter vector. For each solution, we further test at least ten times whether
a new maximization with a guess parameter vector in a small neighborhood of that solution can
achieve a higher level of the posterior density function.
26After obtaining four separate chains of 100,000 draws, we compute the covariance matrix (with
a 25% burn-in) and generate four new chains of 100,000 draws. We repeat this step two more times
with 200,000 and 500,000 draws, respectively. At this stage, we use these last four chains to extract
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of each parameter.
The first result that emerges from these tables is that the measure of market
segmentation is very small—the posterior 90% interval for ωu is (0.824,0.993) with a
median of 0.947 and a mode of 0.983. Given our prior, the data strongly pushes against
a model with a significant degree of market segmentation. Ceteris paribus, we should
expect small macroeconomic effects of asset purchases. In order to check the stability
of the estimate of market segmentation (and, in general, of other parameters), we re-
estimated the model with alternative samples. While in our baseline estimation the
sample ends in 2009q3 (just before the first U.S. LSAP program), we considered three
alternative endings: 2007q2 (before the recent financial turbulence), 2008q3 (before
the federal funds rate reached the ZLB) and 2011q2 (the most recent available data).
The parameter estimates always remain very comparable.27
The other key parameter is the elasticity of the risk premium to asset purchases
ζ ′. If this elasticity were zero, asset purchases would affect neither the risk premium
nor the real economy. The posterior distribution turns out to be concentrated at low
levels, although different from zero, with a median of 0.327/100 and a 90% interval
of (0.086,0.826), suggesting a fairly small impact of the quantity of debt on the risk
premium and the 10-year yield. This finding collocates our estimate of the elasticity
of the risk premium to the quantity of debt at the lower end of the spectrum in the
literature.
The sensitivity of consumption to the interest rate is estimated to be 3.4 for the
unrestricted type and 2.1 for the restricted type at the posterior median. These num-
bers suggest a specification of utility far enough from the usual log-utility assumption
the parameter posterior distribution properties and to simulate the effects of asset purchases.
27One caveat is that most of our sample corresponds to a period of relative macroeconomic and
financial stability in the U.S.. Because the recent crisis may have exacerbated financial frictions, we
subject our main experiment to a robustness check where we allow for an (exogenous) increase in
the degree of segmentation.
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but also significant heterogeneity in the sensitivity to the interest rate for the two
types. Finally, the posterior moments for the nominal rigidity parameters and policy
rule coefficients are consistent with several contributions in the DSGE literature (e.g.
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008)). Importantly, price rigidities are estimated to be
quite high relative to the micro-evidence. These parameters may significantly influ-
ence the simulations. Therefore, in the robustness analysis, we repeat our baseline
experiment with ζp set at the prior mean.
1.3.4 Interest Rate Diagnostics
This section briefly discusses a number of interest rate diagnostics (variance, variance
decomposition, historical shock decomposition). More details, including tables and
plots, are available in the appendix.
As we use data on both short and long-term interest rates, our model can match the
exact path of these variables through Kalman filtering and smoothing. Nonetheless,
we can also compute the model-based unconditional moments for each variable. In
particular, we focus on the variance of interest rates that the model is able to produce
given the posterior distributions of the parameters.28 Our DSGE model captures more
than half of the variance of the FFR in the data (0.44 versus 0.81) and about one
quarter of the ten-year yield (0.12 versus 0.47).29 While our DSGE model, like most,
fails to completely explain the term structure, we nevertheless provide a theory of
how changes in long-term rates affect the real economy.
Different shocks explain the variance of short and long-term interest rates. For the
28To compute the model-based unconditional variance of a certain variable, we draw a vector of
parameters from the joint posterior distribution, compute the unconditional variance of the variable
of interest, repeat the procedure 1000 times and then take the median.
29The performance for long-term rates is not much worse than three-factors affine models of the
term structure of interest rates. For example, the R2 of the regression for the ten-year yield in
Balduzzi, Das, Foresi, and Sundaram (1996) is 31%.
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FFR, the shock to the marginal efficiency of investment is the single most important
driver of the variance at business cycle frequencies (periodic components with cycles
between 6 and 32 quarters), consistent with the findings in Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2010). In the shorter run, shocks to the monetary policy rule play
a non-trivial role while at longer horizons preference shocks become relevant. The
volatility of long-term rates is mostly accounted for (roughly 60%) by shocks to the
risk premium, with preference and marginal utility of investment shocks splitting the
remaining 40% of the variance more or less equally.
The historical shock decomposition is related to the variance decomposition but
is conditional on the actual path of the data. The product of the historical shock
decomposition is the marginal contribution of each shock to the path of each variable
in the model. As with the variance, we report results for the median across 1000
draws. Shocks to the risk premium pushed down the FFR since 1994, between 2
and 3 percentage points. Since 2007, monetary policy shocks have been exerting the
opposite pressure. Our model hence suggests that economic conditions, not discre-
tionary policy decisions, account for the low policy rate during the recent financial
crisis.30 The shock to the marginal efficiency of investment—the key factor in the
variance decomposition—captures fairly well the cyclical movements in the FFR with
two notable exceptions: the early 1990s, when µt exercises downward pressures while
the FFR is actually going up, and the end of the sample, when µt shock is pushing
the FFR up. The same risk premium shocks that put downward pressure on the
FFR since 1994 exert the opposite force on long-term rates, although other shocks
(in particular, preference and productivity) partly offset this dynamics, especially at
the end of the sample.
30Because the FFR eventually hit the zero lower bound in the Fall of 2008, one way to recast this
result is that the interest rate rule in the model calls for negative nominal interest rates.
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1.4 Simulating LSAP II
Our baseline experiment corresponds to a simulation of the U.S. LSAP II program,
announced with the FOMC statement of November 3, 2010. The central bank buys
long-term bonds (in exchange for short-term bonds) over the course of four quarters,
holds its balance sheet constant for the following two years and progressively shrinks
its holdings of long-term securities over the final two years of the simulation. We
calibrate the size of the asset purchase program to match a $600 billion reduction of
long-term debt in the hands of the private sector. Figure 1.1 illustrates the path of
the market value of long-term bonds in the hands of the private sector (in deviations
from trend) following the central bank purchases.31
We also impose that the FFR stays at the ZLB for the first four quarters after the
beginning of the asset purchase program (the “extended period” language), consistent
with the survey evidence from Blue Chip.32 In the technical appendix, we explain the
exact details of how we implement this commitment to the zero lower bound.
We begin by showing our main simulation of LSAP II at the prior distribution
and then repeat the same experiment at the posterior. The following two subsections
discuss the role of the commitment to the zero lower bound and how LSAP compares
to interest rate policy shocks. In the technical appendix we present several robustness
results.
31To be precise, we perform the simulation by feeding a series of shocks to the rule controlling the
level of long-term bonds in the hands of the public that is announced to all agents in the economy.
As such, the private sector is aware of the whole path when forming expectations about the future.
32Blue Chip has been asking the survey participants about the expected duration of the ZLB
since the end of 2008. Until the recent (FOMC statement of August 9, 2011) change in the Federal
Open Market Committee language that introduced a specific date for the expected liftoff, market
participants had always maintained the expectation that the FFR would remain at the ZLB for the
four/five quarters after the question was asked.
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1.4.1 Simulation at the Prior Distribution
This section illustrates how the choice of the priors constrains the macroeconomic
effects of asset purchase programs via Monte Carlo simulations. Specifically, we obtain
1000 random draws for the parameter vector using the prior distribution. We then
use each of these draws to solve the model and extract the path of the state variables
in response to the LSAP experiment described above. Finally, we compute moments
and percentiles of this sample of responses for the variables of interest.33
Figure 1.2 shows the response of output growth, output level, inflation, FFR,
10-year yield and risk premium to the simulated LSAP II experiment at the prior
distribution, all in annualized percentage rates. The level of output corresponds to
percentage deviations from trend, as opposed to a rate of change, and thus is not
annualized. These plots represent the marginal contribution of LSAP II, i.e. the
deviations of each variable relative to the path that would have prevailed absent
the policy intervention. The red continuous line is the prior median response while
the grey shaded area corresponds to the 50th, 60th, 70th, and 80th prior probability
intervals, from darker to lighter shading respectively.
The prior for the elasticity of the risk premium to the quantity of long-term
debt implies a median response at the peak of about 30 bp, consistent with the
estimates in Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011). The uncertainty bands
cover pretty much the whole range of estimates in the empirical literature discussed
in the introduction and summarized in Table 1.1. As a consequence of the change in
the risk premium, output growth, the output level and inflation are higher than in
the absence of asset purchases. By construction, the asset purchase program achieves
the desired effect in the model. The key question is how big these effects are. Our
prior is fairly generous, encompassing very large effects, but also relative agnostic, as
33The results are not sensitive to increasing the number of draws.
27
to extract as much information as possible from the data without imposing too many
ex-ante restrictions. To be more precise, the median prior response of output growth
is 2.7% and the median response of inflation is 1.08%, roughly in line with the results
in Baumeister and Benati (2010). Using a vector auto regression (VAR) model with
time-varying coefficients, these authors find that a 60 bp reduction in long-term rates
increases GDP growth by 3% and the inflation rate of the GDP deflator by 1% at the
posterior median.
Our prior may be seen as too generous to the extent that we allow the effects of
LSAP to be potentially quite extreme (for example the 80th percentile is above 15% for
GDP growth and inflation). The literature, however, does not rule out these extreme
outcomes. For example, Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, and Theodoris (2011) present
VAR evidence for the effects of similar policies on GDP growth in the United Kingdom
that can be as high as 5% at the mean, depending on the estimation method. Our
choice of fairly uninformative priors gives the model a chance to generate such large
effects.
In response to higher output and inflation, the central bank eventually increases
the interest rate in accordance with the policy rule, but only after the end of the
commitment to the ZLB. The evolution of the 10-year yield reflects the combined
effect of the responses of the risk premium and the expected future short-term interest
rate (expectations hypothesis). The former puts negative pressure on the long yield
while the latter exerts the opposite pressure. The outcome depends on how effective
asset purchases ultimately are in boosting the economy. If LSAP programs have a
significant effect on output and inflation, the policy rule dictates a strong response
of the federal funds rate which can potentially dominate over the negative impact on
the risk premium and lead to an equilibrium increase in the 10-year yield.
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1.4.2 Simulation at the Posterior Distribution
In the previous subsection, we concluded that, according to this model and our choice
of the priors for the parameters, LSAP programs can boost output and inflation while
the effect on the 10-year yield is somewhat ambiguous, depending on the interplay
between the risk premium and the expectation hypothesis. In this section, we combine
the prior with the data for the past twenty years or so to form a posterior distribution
of the parameters. We then use the posterior to revisit our simulations of the effects
of LSAP II. Figure 1.3 shows the same variables and simulation as Figure 1.2, but
now using parameter draws from the posterior distribution.
The policy intervention reduces the risk premium by 11 bp on impact at the
posterior median, reflecting the small elasticity of this variable to the quantity of
debt discussed earlier. Combined with a small estimated degree of segmentation, not
surprisingly the effects of LSAP II on aggregate activity are modest. On impact,
GDP growth increases by 0.13% at the posterior median. The uncertainty is skewed
on the upside to about 0.6%, partly due to the ZLB. After three quarters, the effect on
output growth is less than a half of its peak (which occurs on impact) and completely
vanishes after eight quarters. The effects on the level of output are modest too. The
peak in this case occurs after 6 quarters at about 0.1% (posterior median), but now
the effects persist longer—after 24 quarters, the output level is still more than 0.05%
higher than without asset purchases. The reason for the high level of persistence of
the level of real economic activity is that the asset purchase program induces small
but long-lasting movements in real interest rates.34 This modest but persistent effect
on GDP level is likely to be important from a welfare perspective—even more so if we
consider that the 90th probability interval allows for an increase in the level of GDP
34The persistence of both inflation and the nominal interest rate after exiting the ZLB is quite
evident from Figure 1.3.
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as high as 0.5%. The effect on inflation is very small, 3 annualized bp at the median,
and skewed upward, but even the 95th percentile is only about 15 bp.
In spite of the small magnitudes, the positive boost of asset purchases to GDP
growth and inflation puts upward pressure on the interest rate. After the four quarters
at the ZLB which correspond to the commitment period, the FFR becomes positive
but the median increase is only 4 bp. Because asset purchases introduce little stimulus,
the central bank does not raise interest rates by much upon exiting the ZLB. The
upward skewness in the FFR reflects the skewness in the effects on GDP growth and
inflation. Later, we disentangle the effects of the non-linearity introduced by the ZLB
from the pure estimation uncertainty.
The drop in the 10-year yield almost coincides with the reduction in the risk
premium. Because the FFR only increases few basis points upon exiting the ZLB,
the expectation hypothesis component of long-term rates plays a minor role.
Importantly, the duration of the ZLB commitment interacts with the LSAP pro-
gram. Recently, the Federal Reserve has extended its commitment to keep the nom-
inal interest rate at zero for a longer period.35 The marginal effect of increasing the
ZLB commitment by one extra quarter almost doubles the effects on GDP growth
and GDP level while the effect on inflation is 50% bigger.36 These results show very
clearly that in this model the ZLB commitment is very powerful in stimulating the
economy, due to the strongly forward looking behavior of the agents in the economy,
and its effects increase non-linearly with the number of quarters of the commitment.
To summarize, the effects of LSAP II on GDP and inflation are modest, especially
compared to the simulation at the prior, although the effects on the output level are
quite persistent. The main reason for this result is that the two crucial parameters
that control the effects of asset purchases on real activity—the degree of segmentation
35At the time we are writing this paper, the commitment is “at least through late 2014.”
36More details are available in the appendix.
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and the elasticity of the risk premium to the quantity of debt in the hands of the
private sector—are estimated to be small. Yet, the posterior distributions for both
these parameters are skewed so that we cannot completely discard the possibility of
larger effects. Together with the ZLB, the long tails of the posterior estimates for
ωu and ζ
′ contribute to the upward skewness of the response of GDP growth and
inflation in the baseline simulation.
Our results are at the lower end of the spectrum in the existing literature. Beside
the estimates in Baumeister and Benati (2010) mentioned earlier, Chung, Laforte,
Reifschneider, and Williams (2011), using the FRB/US model, assume that LSAP II
induces a reduction in the risk premium of only 20 bp but increases the level of GDP
by about 0.6% and inflation rate by 0.1%.
The results in this section are subject to the caveat, discussed for example in
D’Amico, English, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2011), that the use of aggregate data
on debt may bias the results, weakening the effects of asset purchases on yields. One
possible rationalization of this bias is that our treatment of the sample as homogeneous
may have overlooked a structural change in the underlying structure of financial
markets caused by the recent crisis. Alternatively, active debt management policy
by the Treasury, in an attempt to minimize the financing costs of debt issuance, may
make the elasticity of the risk premium to the quantity of debt hard to estimate.
Under this hypothesis, the Treasury internalizes the asset market friction to minimize
the interest rate cost of marginal funding so that, ex-post, the data display very
little relationship between yield spreads and relative supply of assets at different
maturities.37
In the working paper version of this study (Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2011)),
we estimate the model without using observations on the quantity of debt. In that
37We thank the referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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case, our prior on the elasticity of the risk premium to the quantity of debt encom-
passes most of the estimates in the empirical literature. Because the elasticity is not
well-identified in this case, the posterior median coincides with the prior, which cor-
responds to a cumulative effect of -30 bp on the risk premium in response to LSAP II
(e.g. Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011)). Under this specification, LSAP II
increases GDP growth by 0.4% at the posterior median, while the impact on inflation
is very similar to the case in which the quantity of debt is used in the estimation.38
1.4.3 The Role of the ZLB
In this subsection, we show that the commitment of the central bank to keep the short-
term nominal interest rate at the ZLB for an “extended period” amplifies the effects
of LSAP II. According to our simulations, asset purchases boost GDP growth and
increase inflation, thus leading the central bank to increase the FFR. This endogenous
interest rate response mitigates the macroeconomic stimulus of asset purchase pro-
grams through the conventional monetary policy channel. A commitment to keep the
short-term nominal interest rate at the ZLB for an “extended” period of time prevents
the endogenous response of the monetary authority and magnifies the contribution
of asset purchases on macroeconomic outcomes. Here, we quantify the magnitude of
such a mitigation effect.
Figure 1.4 shows the responses in the case in which we do not impose the commit-
ment to the zero lower bound. For reference, the dashed blue line corresponds to the
baseline simulation with the commitment to the ZLB imposed. Quantitatively, the
ZLB commitment more than triples the effects of asset purchases on GDP growth.
Absent this commitment, output growth increases by 0.04%, compared to 0.13% in
38Interestingly, the estimated degree of segmentation does not change appreciably between the
two cases. Hence, the different effect on GDP growth is to attribute entirely to the elasticity of the
risk premium to the quantity of debt.
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the baseline experiment. Inflation increases by less than 2 bp (0.018%), compared to
3 bp in the baseline case.
Interestingly, while the profile for the FFR differs from the baseline, the 10-year
yield is almost identical. The cumulative effect of the increase in short rates on
long rates via the expectation-hypothesis component is the same. Without ZLB, the
increase in nominal rates occurs earlier but is smoother.
Importantly, the responses to LSAP II remain skewed upward, regardless of whether
the ZLB is imposed or not. This observation suggests that the role of the skewness in
the posterior distribution of the degree of segmentation and of the semi-elasticity of
the risk premium to the quantity of debt play a central role in explaining the upside
uncertainty of the response of macroeconomic variables.
1.4.4 Comparison with a Standard Monetary Policy Shock
One of the motivations for central banks to engage in asset purchases is to support
output and inflation at times in which the ZLB constrains conventional interest rate
setting. To give a sense of the relative effectiveness of these two policies, this section
compares the effects of asset purchase programs discussed so far with a standard
monetary policy shock, that is, an unexpected reduction of the short-term nominal
interest rate.
Figure 1.5 shows the response of the key macroeconomic variables to an unex-
pected reduction of 25 bp in the short-term interest rate. The median effect on GDP
growth is somewhat stronger than in the baseline simulation previously discussed
while the median effect on inflation is very much comparable.39 Furthermore, the ef-
39The median effects of the monetary policy shock on output and inflation in our model are
slightly smaller than in standard estimated DSGE models, such as Smets and Wouters (2007). The
key parameters that determine this result are the higher estimated degree of price rigidity and the
lower sensitivity of demand to the interest rate (higher coefficient of risk aversion).
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fects of the interest rate shock on the output level are not only stronger but also more
persistent than those of LSAP. The implied decrease in long-term rates, however, is
much smaller, only 1 bp.40 Moreover, the long-term rate quickly turns positive. This
result is not surprising given that the risk premium does not change. Therefore, the
expectation hypothesis component completely pins down the long-term interest rate
in this case.
Another significant difference is the smaller uncertainty about the effects in the
case of an interest rate shock. The absence of the ZLB constraint may in part explain
why the posterior bands are more symmetric. Yet, as discussed in the previous
subsection, even in the absence of a commitment to the ZLB, uncertainty remains
skewed upward, mostly due to the skewness of the posterior estimates of the degree
segmentation and of the semi-elasticity of the term premium to the quantity of debt.
Because asset market frictions play a smaller role in case of a shock to the short-term
interest rate, the uncertainty in the response of GDP growth and inflation becomes
smaller and much more symmetric.
Overall, in this model, the effects of LSAP II on output and inflation are slightly
smaller than those of a surprise reduction of the FFR by 25 bp, and much more
uncertain. This conclusion stands in contrast with Furher and Moore (1995), who
find that output is four times more sensitive to long-term than short-term rates.
According to this metric, the 11 bp reduction in the risk premium triggered by LSAP
II should be equivalent to a reduction of the FFR of about 44 bp. Our results are thus
much less generous to changes in the risk premium, confirming our previous finding
that the model simulations yield weaker effects of LSAP II on output and inflation
than what the VAR literature suggests.
40Our estimates thus imply a much smaller sensitivity of long-term rates to shocks to the short-
term rate. As a point of comparison, Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) estimate that the typical
response of long rates to a cut of 100 bp in the FFR is 15 bp.
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1.5 Conclusions
Using an estimated medium-scale DSGE model, we find that the effects of recent asset
purchase programs on macroeconomic variables, such as GDP growth and inflation,
are likely to be modest, although with a lasting impact on the level of GDP. Asset
purchase programs are in principle effective at stimulating the economy because of
limits to arbitrage and market segmentation between short-term and long-term gov-
ernment bonds. The data, however, provide little support for these frictions to be
pervasive.
In the appendix, we consider several robustness exercises and find that the effects
on GDP growth are not very likely to exceed a third of a percentage point. The infla-
tionary consequences of asset purchase programs are consistently small. Combining
LSAP programs with a commitment to keep interest rates low for some period of time
allows these programs to be more effective in boosting GDP growth and inflation.
Our results do not depend on whether asset purchases are financed via reserves
or sales of short-term debt, to the extent that money and short-term bonds are close
to perfect substitutes. Therefore, according to our model, the effects of the Federal
Reserve’s last round of asset purchases (also known as “Operation Twist Again”)
should be in line with the estimates from LSAP II after controlling for the scale
factor.
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Table 1.1: Estimated Impact of LSAPs on the 10-Year Treasury Yield in the Litera-
ture.
Papers Total Impact Impact per $100 Bil
Hamilton and Wu (2010) -13 bp -3 bp
Doh (2010) -39 bp -4 bp
D’Amico and King (2010) -45 bp -15 bp
Bomfim and Meyer (2010) -60 bp -3 bp
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011) -58 bp to-91 bp -3 bp to-5 bp
Neely (2010) -107 bp -6 bp
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) -33 bp (LSAP2) -5 bp
D’Amico, English, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2011) -55 bp (LSAP2) -9 bp
Swanson (2011) -15 bp (Twist)
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Table 1.2: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distribution: Structural Parameters.
Prior Posterior
Dist 5% Median 95% Mode Mean 5% Median 95%
400γ G 1.7382 2.4667 3.3752 1.9922 1.9867 1.5413 1.9805 2.4515
400pi G 1.2545 1.9585 2.8871 2.2404 2.1477 1.5075 2.1376 2.8237
400(β−1u − 1) G 0.6272 0.9792 1.4436 0.4943 0.4890 0.3282 0.4828 0.6706
400ζ G 0.3913 0.7224 1.2029 0.4761 0.5127 0.2735 0.4968 0.8082
BLMV /B G 0.6953 0.9867 1.3501 0.8222 0.8502 0.7164 0.8533 0.9712
S ′′ G 2.5090 3.9170 5.7743 4.4277 4.8371 3.3764 4.7815 6.5330
a′′ G 0.0683 0.1836 0.3877 0.2093 0.2322 0.0994 0.2159 0.4189
h B 0.4302 0.6029 0.7597 0.8370 0.7898 0.6421 0.8020 0.9007
σu G 0.6832 1.8360 3.8768 3.0151 3.4958 1.9891 3.3548 5.4795
σr G 0.6832 1.8360 3.8768 1.5635 2.2370 0.8692 2.0825 4.1268
100ζ ′ G 0.3067 1.2846 3.4294 0.2420 0.3763 0.0862 0.3274 0.8257
ωu B 0.3214 0.7334 0.9646 0.9832 0.9322 0.8237 0.9468 0.9934
Ξu/Ξr G 0.3416 0.9180 1.9384 0.7917 1.1403 0.4537 1.0730 2.0683
Cu/Cr G 0.3416 0.9180 1.9384 0.7641 1.0533 0.3921 0.9760 1.9747
χwu B 0.2486 0.6143 0.9024 0.5170 0.5566 0.2825 0.5611 0.8187
ν G 1.2545 1.9585 2.8871 1.6814 1.9658 1.2518 1.9295 2.7996
ζw B 0.3351 0.5000 0.6649 0.6860 0.7309 0.6292 0.7342 0.8205
ζp B 0.3351 0.5000 0.6649 0.9260 0.9287 0.9116 0.9288 0.9452
φT G 0.7825 1.4448 2.4058 1.2660 1.3147 0.6890 1.2543 2.1216
ρr B 0.5242 0.7068 0.8525 0.8547 0.8556 0.8182 0.8565 0.8903
φpi G 1.0164 1.7026 2.6453 1.5644 1.6090 1.3706 1.5979 1.8866
φy G 0.1366 0.3672 0.7754 0.2975 0.3295 0.2487 0.3251 0.4247
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Table 1.3: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distribution: Shock Process Parameters.
Prior Posterior
Dist 5% Median 95% Mode Mean 5% Median 95%
ρz B 0.0976 0.3857 0.7514 0.1286 0.1486 0.0448 0.1430 0.2706
ρµ B 0.5701 0.7595 0.8971 0.8293 0.8477 0.7906 0.8489 0.8998
ρb B 0.5701 0.7595 0.8971 0.9603 0.9597 0.9388 0.9614 0.9764
ρφ B 0.5701 0.7595 0.8971 0.5200 0.5063 0.3767 0.5074 0.6345
ρB B 0.6146 0.8135 0.9389 0.9773 0.9652 0.9396 0.9659 0.9880
ρζ B 0.6146 0.8135 0.9389 0.9614 0.9402 0.9012 0.9426 0.9700
ρg B 0.5701 0.7595 0.8971 0.7581 0.7397 0.5542 0.7491 0.8943
σz IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 0.7426 0.7624 0.6742 0.7588 0.8634
σλf IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 1.6306 1.9235 1.1103 1.7930 3.1600
σµ IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 2.8430 3.0102 2.2984 2.9725 3.8662
σb IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 3.0703 3.7799 2.2957 3.5860 5.8901
σφ IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 0.4518 0.9048 0.3100 0.7628 1.9982
σB IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 0.3686 0.3656 0.2930 0.3578 0.4660
σT IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 0.2348 0.5521 0.1670 0.3457 1.3682
σm IG1 0.0819 0.1700 0.6217 0.1130 0.1167 0.1019 0.1161 0.1335
σζ IG1 0.0819 0.1700 0.6217 0.2137 0.2667 0.1900 0.2592 0.3694
σg IG1 0.1663 0.3433 1.2367 0.2439 0.3894 0.1688 0.3429 0.7619
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Figure 1.1: Simulated Path of the Market Value of Long-Term Debt.
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Figure 1.2: Responses to Calibrated LSAP II Experiment at the Prior Distribution.
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Figure 1.3: Responses to Calibrated LSAP II Experiment at the Posterior Distribu-
tion.
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Figure 1.4: Responses to LSAP II Experiment with (dashed blue line) and without
(continuous red line) ZLB Commitment.
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Figure 1.5: Responses to an Annualised 25 bp Innovation to the FFR (continuous red
line), Compared to the Baseline LSAP II Experiment (dashed blue line).
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Chapter 2
Assessing the Effects of
Large-Scale Asset Purchases in a
Zero-Interest-Rate Environment
through the Lens of DSGE Models
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I study two types of DSGE models that break the neutrality of LSAPs
as in chapter 1 and Harrison (2010) and two methods of modeling the ZIRP in DSGE
models: the PFRE model and the Markov regime-switching model I develop in this
chapter in order to better predict the distribution of macroeconomic variables. I fit
those DSGE models to the U.S. data from the third quarter of 1987 to the second
quarter of 2010, and then, starting from the third quarter of 2010, I simulate the U.S.
economy forward under four scenarios: the counterfactual scenario when there is no
policy intervention, only LSAP intervention, only ZIRP for an extended period, and
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the combination of LSAPs and ZIRP. In order to assess the effectiveness of the asset
purchase policy and the policy of an extended period of near-zero interest rates, I
compare the predicted path of the macro variables (output and inflation) under the
policy intervention with the predicted path of the macro variables absent of both asset
purchase and ZIRP (the counterfactual scenario when there is no policy intervention).
I found that the effects of the LSAPs alone are insignificant measured in the DSGE
models, while the ZIRP has a substantial effect.
In chapter 1 the ZIRP is modeled by the PFRE model. This chapter proposes
to model the ZIRP by a Markov regime-switching monetary policy rule where, in
one regime, the policy rates follow a typical Taylor rule, and, in the other regime, it
involves a policy of zero interest rates. I solve this regime-switching DSGE model by
using the Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) minimum state variable solution. I con-
struct the optimal filters in order to estimate this regime-switching DSGE model with
Bayesian methods. I compare this method of modeling the ZIRP in DSGE models
with the PFRE. The simulation of the Federal Reserve’s ZIRP reveals that the effects
of ZIRP on macro variables crucially depend on the models: the regime-switching
model implies a substantial effect of ZIRP. PFRE implies a five-fold stronger stim-
ulus of ZIRP to inflation. The fundamental difference between these two types of
models is how agents’ expectations are formulated. In the Markov regime-switching
model, at each period agents attach certain probability of exiting the ZIRP regime in
the next period despite the Federal Reserve’s “extended period” language, because,
for example, the simple announcement would be subject to the time inconsistency
problem, and is thus incredible. The PFRE assumes that agents believe the Federal
Reserve’s announcement and have perfect foresight of future interest rates. The pre-
dicted path of macro variables generated by the regime-switching model is closer to
the actual path.
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Here, I am looking at this extended period of zero interest rates as a policy choice41
because the central bank could raise the interest rates when the output starts growing,
and the economy is improving as advised by the Taylor rule. Carlstrom, Fuerst, and
Paustian (2012), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), and chapter 1 also study the effects of
a transient interest rate peg. Under the assumption of either a deterministic exit or
a stochastic exit of the interest rate peg in the previous studies, the policy rate will
follow a Taylor rule after the exit and the interest rate peg will never occur again. In
my regime-switching model, however, zero interest rate policy regime is a recurring
event. Even at the normal interest rate regime, agents expect to enter zero interest
rate regime in the future with certain probability. Expectations play an important role
in the regime-switching model. An alternative angle to look at this persistent period of
low interest rates is the zero lower bound (ZLB) problem. A persistent shock42 drives
interest rates below zero if the central bank keeps following a Taylor rule. A rapidly
growing literature on ZLB considers the zero interest rates as a modeling constraint
that has to be considered. Global methods include Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2011),
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2012), and
Aruoba and Schorfheide (2012). There are also a few short cuts for modeling ZLB:
such as Braun and Korber (2011), Adam and Billi (2007), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011). Del Negro and Schorfheide
(2012) describe how to impose zero interest rates via unanticipated or anticipated
monetary policy shocks in a DSGE model.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Since chapter 1 and Appendix A
describe the market segmentation model extensively, the next section only presents
the bonds-in-utility model where the LSAPs’ neutrality result can also be broken in
41Here the regime-switching is exogenous while ideally it should be endogenous and depend on
the macroeconomic condition.
42For example a preference shock or a technology shock.
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the DSGE models. Section 2.3 discusses how to model ZIRP with a regime-switching
monetary policy and with the PFRE. Section 2.4 describes the estimation of the
regime-switching model, some basic analysis of parameter estimates, an evaluation
of the effects of the LSAPs and the ZIRP, and the comparison between the regime-
switching model and the PFRE model. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Models
In the households sector, I will explain how the typical no-arbitrage condition for
short-term and long-term bonds can be broken in order for LSAPII43 to have a real
effect. I will describe a variation of Harrison (2010). The rest of the sectors are stan-
dard in medium-scale DSGE models (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005);
Smets and Wouters (2007)) and the detailed description can be found in Appendix
A: Monopolistic competitive firms hire the labor to produce intermediate goods;
competitive final goods producing firms package intermediate goods into a homoge-
neous consumption good. Finally, the government sets monetary and fiscal policy. To
simplify the analysis, I abstract from capital and wage stickiness.
2.2.1 Households
A common means by which the asset purchases can be effective is that if the cen-
tral bank changes its portfolio composition in equilibrium, private investor must also
change their portfolio choices, and, in order to induce them to do so, the equilib-
rium asset prices must also change accordingly. However, a mere difference in state-
contingent returns on different assets is not enough for central bank portfolio changes
43Notice that through out the thesis I only concentrate on the second round of LSAPs whose
purpose is to bring down long-term interest rates and boost economic growth.
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to have an effect because the private investors will fully take advantage of the ar-
bitrage opportunities and hedge against the central bank’s operation. Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2011) present a detailed explanation for this. This neutrality result only
depends on two postulates: All investors can buy or sell the same assets at the same
market prices, and all assets are valued only for their pecuniary returns. Chapter 1
proposes market segmentation to break the first postulate while Harrison (2010) tar-
gets the second postulate. Both approaches are based on Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido, and
Nelson (2004). Throughout the chapter, I will refer to the first approach as “market
segmentation” approach and the second as the “BIU” (bonds-in-utility) approach.
Bonds-in-Utility
The representative household’s objective function is a slight modification of Harrison
(2010):
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsbt+s

(
Ct+s
Zt+s
)1−σ
1− σ −
ϕt+sL
1+ν
t+s
1 + ν
− ν˜
2
(
δ
Bt+s
PL,t+sBL,t+s
− 1
)2 ,
where in the last term Bt+s
PL,t+sBL,t+s
represents the ratio of the market value of short-
term bonds to that of long-term bonds. δ is the inverse of the steady state of this
ratio so that at steady state, the last term is zero. ν˜ controls the elasticity of the
households’ portfolio choice in response to the long-term bond rate. The intuition
of bonds-in-utility is similar to money-in-utility. Because long-term bonds are not
as liquid as short-term bonds, holding a non-optimal portfolio composition induces a
utility cost.
The time t budget constraint for a household is
PtCt +Bt + (1 + ζt)PL,tB
L
t ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 +PL,tRL,tBLt−1 +WtLt +Pt +Pfit −Tt, (2.1)
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where, ζt, is also a transaction cost (but not a function of the bonds) with a nonzero
steady state. This is to capture that, at steady state, the yield of the long-term bonds
is higher than that of the short-term bonds, as observed in the data. The definitions
of the rest of the variables are the same as the market segmentation model described
in the previous chapter.
Let ΞPt represent the Lagrange multiplier for (2.1). The loglinearized Euler equa-
tion for the short-term bonds is
ν˜
ΞBz
̂BLMV Bt − Ξˆt + Rˆt + Ξˆt+1 − zˆt+1 − Πˆt+1 = 0,
where BLMV Bt =
BLz,t
(RL,t−κ)
Bz,t
44, and ̂BLMV Bt = BˆLz,t − Bˆz,t − RL(RL−κ)RˆL,t.And the
loglinearized Euler equation for the long-term bonds is
ν˜
δ (1 + ζ) ΞBz
̂BLMV Bt + Ξˆt + ζˆt − RL
RL − κRˆL,t + Et
[
κ
RL − κRˆL,t+1 − Ξˆt+1 + zˆt+1 + Πˆt+1
]
= 0.
The BIU specification distinguishably differs from the market segmentation approach
by allowing the portfolio choice to directly affect the households’ consumption choice.
This, in turn, will affect the stochastic discount factor and thus the price of the long-
term bond. Again, LSAPs are designed to have a real effect. The advantage of this
specification is its simplicity. Household heterogeneity dramatically increases the scale
of the market segmentation model, and thus estimating and drawing from the poste-
rior of the market segmentation model are challenging, while the BIU specification is
a lot more manageable.
44BLz,t =
BLt
PtZt
, and Bz,t =
Bt
PtZt
.
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2.2.2 Government Policies
The monetary policy is taken from the chapter 1. The central bank follows a con-
ventional feedback interest rate rule similar to Taylor (1993), modified to include the
interest rate smoothing (Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000)) and to use the growth rate
of output instead of the output gap (Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011)):
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρm [(Πt
Π
)φpi (Yt/Yt−4
e4γ
)φy]1−ρm
em,t , (2.2)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the inflation rate, ρm ∈ (0, 1), φpi > 1, φy ≥ 0, and m,t is an
i.i.d. innovation.45 In the section (2.3.1), I will elaborate how to modify the monetary
policy rule to assess ZIRP.
The presence of long-term bonds modifies the standard government budget con-
straint as follows:
Bt + PL,tB
L
t = Rt−1,tBt−1 + (1 + κPL,t)B
L
t−1 + PtGt − Tt. (2.3)
The left-hand side of expression (2.3) is the market value, in nominal terms, of the
total amount of bonds (short-term and long-term) issued by the government at time
t. The right-hand side is the total deficit at time t, that is, market value plus interest
payment of the bonds maturing in that period plus spending Gt net of taxes.
I assume that the supply of the government bonds is exogenous, and the ratio of
the market value of long-term bonds to that of the short-term bonds follows a simple
45Chapter 1 uses the output growth in the Taylor rule, instead of the output gap, to avoid the
complication of solving and estimating the system characterizing the flexible price equilibrium. In
practice, GDP growth relative to trend is often cited as one of the main indicators of real activity
for the conduct of monetary policy.
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autoregressive rule
PL,tB
L
t
Bt
= S
(
PL,t−1BLt−1
Bt−1
)ρB
eB,t , (2.4)
where ρB ∈ (0, 1), and B,t is an i.i.d. exogenous supply shock. S is whatever constant
needed to make the above equation an identity at the steady state. I interpret LSAPs
program as shocks to the ratio of outstanding government long-term liabilities to
short-term liabilities compared to the historical behavior of these series.
2.2.3 Exogenous Processes
The model is supposed to be fitted to data on output, inflation, hours worked, wages,
nominal interest rates, and market value of bonds. There are seven structural shocks
in total. The logarithm of the technology follows a random walk with drift.
lnZt = γ + lnZt−1 + zt,
where the shock zt follows a first order autoregressive process (AR(1)):
zt = ρzzt + z,t.
The preference shock to leisure follows an AR(1) process:
lnϕt = ρϕ lnϕt−1 + ϕ,t.
The shock to the discount factor β (intertemporal preference shifter) is also assumed
to follow an AR(1) process:
ln bt = ρb ln bt−1 + b,t.
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The government spending is assumed to be an exogenous process:
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + g,t.
The risk premium shock also follows an AR(1) process:
ζt = ρζζt−1 + εζ,t.
The monetary policy shock m,t and the bond supply shock B,t are independent and
identically distributed shocks.
2.3 Zero Interest Rate Policy
In this section, I describe two methods of studying the effects of ZIRP in DSGE
models. Both solution methods take some shortcuts rather than solve fully a nonlinear
New Keynesian model incorporating ZIRP. I am going to consider a regime-switching
model where, in one regime, the policy rate follows a typical Taylor rule, and, in the
other regime, it simply involves ZIRP. Although the regime switching is imposed to
the monetary policy rule before loglinearizing the system, the model is a forward-
looking Markov-switching linear rational expectations model. Ideally, I should apply
the perturbation method for Markov-switching models proposed by Foerster, Rubio-
Ramı´rez, Waggoner, and Zha (2012). Their method begins from first principles rather
than add Markov switching after linearizing the model, and it also allows higher order
solutions. Simplifying assumptions in my model may miss some nonlinear interactions
between the zero interest rates and the policy functions of the agents, however, I
substantially gain tractability. I also construct the optimal filter so that I can fit
this model to the macro data including the recent time where the interest rates are
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maintained near zero for an extended period. This regime-switching model can not
only explain the interest rate data, but also provides a plausible explanation for exiting
the zero interest rate policy. This regime-switching model offers a tool to conduct
forecasts and counterfactual analysis. The other approach to assessing the ZIRP,
PFRE, on the other hand, can not explain the recent episodes of near-zero interest
rates. It only asks the counterfactual questions such as what are the effects to the
macro variables if the interest rates are kept at zero for an extended period, and agents
have perfect knowledge of this policy experiment? Now I define the regime-switching
model more precisely .
2.3.1 Regime-Switching Policy Rule
In this section, I introduce a regime-switching monetary policy rule that will be
incorporated into the DSGE models introduced in section 2.2. I will use the Farmer,
Waggoner, and Zha (2011) minimum state variable solution method to solve this
regime-switching model, and the estimation strategy will be described in section 2.4.
Consider a regime-switching policy rule where, in one regime, the federal funds
rate follows a Taylor rule while, in the other regime, it simply involves the zero interest
rates. The policy rule is
Rt = (R
∗
t (Kt))
1−ρR(Kt)
[(
pitr
R∗t (Kt)
)ϕpi(Kt)(Yt/Yt−4
e4γ
)ϕy(Kt)](1−ρR(Kt))
R
ρR(Kt)
t−1 exp (εR,t) ,
(2.5)
where all the parameters denoted by (Kt) are regime dependent, and R
∗
t are the
desired regime-dependent target nominal interest rates. Let Kt = 1 denote the normal
regime, and Kt = 2 denote the ZIRP regime. For example, I can set R
∗
t (Kt = 1) =
R∗1 = 1.005 which corresponds to a target 2% annual interest rate at the normal
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regime, and set R∗t (Kt = 2) = R
∗
2 = 1.0005 which corresponds to a target 20 basis
points annual interest rate at the second regime. To study the ZIRP, I set
R∗2 = 1,
ρR (Kt = 2) = 0,
ϕpi (Kt = 2) = 0,
ϕy (Kt = 2) = 0,
σεR,t (Kt = 2) = 0.
I define the ergodic mean of the logarithm of the steady state interest rates as
log (R) = λ¯1 log (R
∗
1) + λ¯2 log (R
∗
2) ,
where λ¯1 and λ¯2 are ergodic probabilities.
Divide 2.5 by its ergodic mean, R, and thus:
Rt
R
=
(
R∗t
R
)(1−ρR(Kt))(1−ϕpi(Kt)) [(pit
pi
)ϕpi(Kt)(Yt/Yt−4
e4γ
)ϕy(Kt)](1−ρR(Kt))(Rt−1
R
)ρR(Kt)
exp εR,t.
(2.6)
Loglinearize 2.6 and thus:
Rˆt = ρR (Kt) Rˆt−1 + (1− ρR (Kt))
[
ϕpi (Kt) pˆit + ϕy (Kt)
(
yˆt − yˆt−4 +
i=3∑
i=0
zt−i
)]
+εR,t + (1− ρR (Kt)) (1− ϕpi (Kt)) Rˆ∗t , (2.7)
where the last term represents a regime-switching constant. The Farmer, Waggoner,
and Zha (2011) minimum state variable solution method does not deal with a system
with a constant. I am going to apply the trick by Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011).
They solve a system where the only regime-switching coefficient is the constant. I
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can rewrite 2.7 as
Rˆt = ρR (Kt) Rˆt−1 + (1− ρR (Kt))
[
ϕpi (Kt) pˆit + ϕy (Kt)
(
yˆt − yˆt−4 +
i=3∑
i=0
zt−i
)]
+ εR,t
+ (1− ρR (Kt)) (1− ϕpi (Kt))
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
eˆs,t,
where eˆs,t = es,t − e¯s, and e¯s is the ergodic probability. es,t is defined as:
es,t =
 1St=1
1St=2
 ,
with 1 {st = j} = 1 if st = j, and 0 otherwise. As shown in Hamilton (1994), the
random vector es,t follows an AR(1) process:
es,t = Pes,t−1 + νt, (2.8)
where P is the transition matrix of the Markov switching process, and the innovation
vector has the property that Et−1νt = 0. In the steady state, νt = 0 so that 2.8 defines
the ergodic probabilities for the Markov process e¯s. Schorfheide (2005) also proposes
an algorithm to solve DSGE models with a regime-switching constant in the policy
rule. One can prove that Schorfheide (2005) and Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) give
rise to the same solution46.
By adding two extra variables es,t, I can use the Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2011) minimum state variable solution to solve this regime-switching model. The
46See the appendix for proof.
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solution of the model can be represented by
Zt = Gt (Kt)Zt−1 +Rt (Kt) εt Z1,t
Z2,t
 =
 G11 G12
0 P

 Z1,t−1
Z2,t−1
+
 R11 R12
0 1

 ε1,t
ε2,t
 ,
where I can partition the variables Zt and the shocks εt into two parts: Z2,t is
[eˆt (1) eˆt (2)]
′, ε2,t is [v1,t v2,t]
′, Z1,t are the rest of the states, and ε1,t are the structural
shocks of the DSGE models. I define
C (Kt) = G12 [eˆt−1 (1) eˆt−1 (2)]
′ +R12 [v1,t v2,t]
′ .
Notice that C (Kt) is a regime-dependent constant. Finally I can rewrite the
system as follows with regime-switching coefficients:
Zt = C (Kt) +Gt (Kt)Zt−1 +Rt (Kt) εt.
2.3.2 Model ZIRP by the PFRE
The solution method of the PFRE model was proposed by Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2011). For a detailed description of the algorithm and an application, please refer to
section A.6 or online appendix47. The basic idea is that agents have perfect foresight
of the path of the future interest rates and of all shocks until an arbitrary time point.
From this point forward all the shocks are zero, and the solution method is standard
such as Sims (2002). The system can be solved backwards from this point. The
following is a very simple example to illustrate the solution method. Consider the
47The appendix can be found at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
0297.2012.02549.x/suppinfo
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equilibrium system:
yˆt = Et [yˆt+1]− σ−1 (ˆıt − Et [pˆit+1]) ,
pˆit = βEt [pˆit+1] + κyˆt,
and
ıˆt = φpipˆit + νt, for t > K, νt = 0,
= 0, for t = 1, ...K − 1, K.
The solution for t > K is 
yˆt
pˆit
ıˆt
 =

ψyν
ψpiν
ψiν
 νt.
The system can be broken into the forward-looking and the backward-looking parts.
The forward-looking part is
 1 σ−1
0 β

 Et [yˆt+1]
Et [pˆit+1]
 =
 1 σ−1 0
−κ 0 1


yˆt
ıˆt
pˆit
 ,
and the backward-looking part is
[0 1 − φpi]

yˆt
ıˆt
pˆit
 = νt.
At t = K, plug in the solution to the forward looking part and thus:
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 1 σ−1
0 β

 ψyνEtνt+1
ψpiνEtνt+1
 =
 1 σ−1 0
−κ 0 1


yˆt
ıˆt
pˆit
 .
Combine this with the backward looking part and thus:

0 1 − φpi
1 σ−1 0
−κ 0 1


yˆt
ıˆt
pˆit
 =

0
(ψyν + σ
−1ψpiν)Etνt+1
βψpiνEtνt+1
+

νt
0
0
 .
We can solve this system by inverting a matrix. The solution is

yˆt
ıˆt
pˆit
 =

0 1 − φpi
1 σ−1 0
−κ 0 1

−1

0
(ψyν + σ
−1ψpiν)Etνt+1
βψpiνEtνt+1
+

νt
0
0

 .
We can iterate backwards until the first period.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I compare two methods of modeling LSAPs and two approaches to
modeling ZIRP in DSGE models. Since chapter 1 studies the market segmentation
model carefully, I will only briefly show results. Here, I estimate the bonds-in-utility
DSGE model that either incorporates a regime-switching monetary policy as 2.5 or
a typical Taylor rule as 2.2. I extract the filtered states of those estimated DSGE
models, and then, starting from the third quarter of 2010, I simulate the U.S. economy
forward under four scenarios: no intervention and no shocks, only LSAP intervention,
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only ZIRP for an extended period, and the combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP
for an extended period. I compare the predicted path of macro variables generated
from the different models. When I evaluate ZIRP in the DSGE model with the regular
Taylor rule, the PFRE method is used to simulate the economy. I will only explicate
the estimation strategy of the regime-switching DSGE model. The description of the
estimation procedure of the other non regime-switching model was omitted here. The
Bayesian estimation methods for a linearized DSGE model with constant coefficients
can be found, for example by An and Schorfheide (2007a). Bayesian estimation
combines prior information on the parameters with the likelihood function of the
model to form the posterior distribution. In the regime-switching model, the optimal
filter is no longer the Kalman Filter. I will first illustrate the optimal filter and the
likelihood function for this regime-switching model, and then describe data, show
estimation results, and make comparisons of simulation results.
2.4.1 Optimal Filter and Likelihood Function
Regime-switching model is complicated because usually we have to keep track of the
long history of the distribution of the states, and the number of the states grows
exponentially48. Fortunately, in my application, the distribution of the states at each
time is degenerated, because I observe the interest rates, and thus deduce whether or
not the economy is at the ZIRP regime in that period.
In this New Keynesian economy, the states are denoted by St and the observables
are denoted by yt. Let Kt denote the Markov regime-switching states and λt denote
the probability at the ZIRP regime Kt = 2 at time t, thus Kt = 1, the normal regime,
has probability 1−λt. Let Rˆt denote the log deviation of the regime-switching interest
48Even with a 2-state Markov regime switching process, at time t, the number of states is 2t.
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rates from their ergodic mean. Its density function can be written as:
P
(
Rˆt
)
= λ
1{Rt=0}
t
(
(1− λt) ft
(
Rˆt
))1{Rt>0}
,
where ft
(
Rˆt
)
is the conditional density, conditional on at the normal state. That is
P
(
Rˆt|Rt > 0
)
= ft
(
Rˆt
)
.
Define the Dirac function as
δx˜ (x) =
{
0 if x 6= x˜
∞ if x = x˜
and
∫
δx˜ (x) dx = 1.
Using the Dirac function, I can express the density of the interest rates as
P
(
Rˆt
)
= λtδx˜ (x) + (1− λt) ft
(
Rˆt
)
.
The transition equations are
St (Kt) = C (Kt) +Gt (Kt) St−1 (Kt−1) +Rt (Kt) εt.
where all the coefficients are regime-dependent and the measurement equations are
(no measurement error):
yt (Kt) = TSt (Kt) .
Let λ¯ denote the ergodic probability of the Markov chain and Σk denote the state-
dependent variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks:
Σk = E [εtε
′
t|Kt = k] .
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The algorithm of the optimal filter is as follows:
• Initializing at time t = 1,the mean of the states:
S¯1 = λ¯1 (I −G (Kt = 1))−1C (Kt = 1) +
(
1− λ¯1
)
(I −G (Kt = 2))−1C (Kt = 2) ,
and the variance,
P¯1 = λ¯1X1 +
(
1− λ¯1
)
X2,
where X1 and X2 solve the discrete Lyapunov matrix equations:
G (Kt = 1)X1G (Kt = 1)
′ −X1 +R (Kt = 1) Σ1R (Kt = 1) = 0
and
G (Kt = 2)X2G (Kt = 2)
′ −X2 +R (Kt = 2) Σ2R (Kt = 2) = 0
respectively.
• Forecasting t+ 1 given t
– Transition equation
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P
(
St+1,Kt+1|Y t, θ
)
=
∫
P (St+1,Kt+1|St,Kt)P
(
St,Kt|Y t, θ
)
d (St,Kt)
=
∫
P
(
St+1,−Rˆt+1 ,Kt+1|Rˆt+1, St,Kt
)
P
(
Rˆt+1,Kt+1|St,Kt
)
P
(
St,Kt|Y t, θ
)
d (St,Kt)
=
∫
P
(
St+1,−Rˆt+1 |Kt+1, St,Kt
)
P
(
Rˆt+1|Kt+1, St,Kt
)
P (Kt+1|St,Kt)P
(
St,Kt|Y t, θ
)
d (St,Kt)
=
∫
P
(
St+1,−Rˆt+1 |Kt+1 = 2, St,Kt
)
δ0
(
Rˆt+1 = 0
)
P (Kt+1 = 2|St,Kt)P
(
St,Kt|Y t, θ
)
d (St,Kt)
+
∫
P (St+1|Kt+1 = 1, St,Kt)P (Kt+1 = 1|St,Kt)P
(
St,Kt|Y t, θ
)
d (St,Kt) ,
where St+1,−Rˆt+1 denotes all the states excluding the interest rates. Since the density
of the regime Kt+1, conditional on the last period states and regime, P (Kt+1|St, Kt),
is discrete, I can break the integral into two parts when it is in a ZIRP regime, and
when it is in the normal regime. Notice that when it is in the ZIRP regime, I do not
need to track the distribution of interest rates, because it is degenerated.
• – Measurement equation =⇒ likelihood function
P
(
yt+1|Y t, θ
)
=
∫
P
(
yt+1|St+1, Kt+1,Y t, θ
)
P
(
St+1|Kt+1, Y t, θ
)
P
(
Kt+1|Y t, θ
)
dSt+1dKt+1
= P
(
Kt+1 = 1|Y t, θ
) ∫
P
(
yt+1|St+1, Kt+1,Y t, θ
)
P
(
St+1|Kt+1,Y t, θ
)
dSt+1
+P
(
Kt+1 = 2|Y t, θ
) ∫
P
(
yt+1−R̂t+1|St+1, Kt+1,Y t, θ
)
P
(
St+1|Kt+1,Y t, θ
)
dSt+1.
• Updating
– Updating states
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P
(
St+1, Kt+1|Y t+1, θ
)
∝ P (yt+1|St+1, Kt+1,Y t, θ)P (St+1, Kt+1|Y t, θ)
∝ P (yt+1|St+1, Kt+1,Y t, θ)P (St+1|Kt+1, Y t, θ)P (Kt+1|Y t, θ)
∝ P (yt+1|St+1, Kt+1,Y t, θ)P (St+1|Kt+1, Y t, θ)P (Kt+1 = 1|Y t, θ)
+P
(
yt+1−R̂t+1 |St+1−R̂t+1 , Kt+1,Y t, θ
)
P
(
St+1−R̂t+1|Kt+1, Y t, θ
)
P
(
Kt+1 = 2|Y t, θ
)
.
• – Updating states probability
Since I observe the data yt+1, I observe the interest rate. If Rt+1 = 0, I deduce
that
P
(
Kt+1 = 1|Y t+1
)
= 0, and P
(
Kt+1 = 2|Y t+1
)
= 1
and vice versa. So I do not need to track the long history of the states, because when
I know the history of Y t, I know the history of the states for sure. The distribution
of the states at each time is degenerated. In practice, any quarterly Federal Funds
rate that is smaller than 40bp is treated as zero interest rate.
2.4.2 Data
Data are the same as those used in chapter 1. For a detailed description, please refer
to section A.5.
2.4.3 Prior Choice
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (columns two to four) summarize the prior distributions of each
parameter in the regime-switching DSGE model. I fix the coefficient of relative risk
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aversion σ at 2, and the steady state of the ratio of long-term bonds to short-term
bonds at 1.01, which is consistent with the average of this series in the data. I
use Gamma distributions for the prior distributions of the parameters that economic
theory suggests must be positive. For those parameters that are defined over the
interval [0, 1], I use the Beta distribution. For the standard deviation of the structural
shocks, I use the Inverse-Gamma distribution.
The ergodic mean for inflation is centered at 2%, consistent with the Federal
Open Market Committee’s long-term inflation mandate. The steady state annualized
growth rate of output is centered at 2.5%. The prior distribution of the discount factor
implies the mean of the annualized real interest rate is 2%. The spread between the
short-term rates and long-term rates has a mean of 0.75% (annualized) at its prior
distribution.
I follow Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) to choose the priors for the standard
parameters in the DSGE models. As in chapter 1, the dividend payment parameter
k for the long-term bonds is calibrated to imply a duration of 30 quarters, which
is consistent with the average duration of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bonds in the
secondary market.
Table 2.1 contains three non-standard parameters (ν˜, P11, and P22) specific to this
regime-switching bonds-in-utility model, which controls the elasticity of households’
portfolio mix in response to the long-term rate, the Markov switching probability of
staying in the normal regime at time t + 1 when it is in the normal regime at time
t, and the Markov switching probability of staying in the ZIRP regime at time t + 1
when it is in the ZIRP regime at time t. ν˜ is centered at 0.1 at the prior. Harrison
(2010) uses a parameter with a similar role, and he calibrates this parameter to be
0.09. Andre´s, Lo´pez-Salido, and Nelson (2004) estimate a similar parameter to be
0.045, which describes the elasticity of the risk premium to a change in the ratio of
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long-term bonds to money. I do not have money in my model, but the short-term
bonds fill a similar role as money because it is more liquid than long-term bonds.
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) suggest that a 10% reduction in the stock of
long-term bonds associated with the U.S. Treasury buy-backs reduces long yields by
around 100 basis points. The second round large-scale asset purchases is equivalent
to a 25% reduction in long-term bonds49. This suggests a value for ν˜ around 0.25.
My prior mean lies in between those estimates. P11 is centered at 0.99, which implies
an expected duration of staying in the normal regime is 25 years. P22 is centered at
0.85 at prior, which implies an expected duration of staying in the ZIRP regime is
6.7 quarters, consistent with what is observed in the data.
The prior for the price rigidity parameter, ζp, is centred at 0.5 with a standard
deviation of 0.1, as in Smets and Wouters (2007). The interest rate smoothing pa-
rameter, ρr, is centered at 0.7. The interest rate feedback to output growth, φy, is
centered at 0.4, and the feedback to inflation, φpi, is centered at 1.5 at priors.
All the structural shocks follow AR(1) processes. Their autocorrelation coeffi-
cients are centred at 0.75 or 0.8, with the exception of productivity shocks whose
autocorrelation coefficient is centered at 0.4, because this process characterizes the
transitory shock to the growth rate of the technology process.
2.4.4 Parameter Posterior Distribution
In order to obtain the posterior distribution of the parameters, I first obtain the
posterior mode by maximizing the likelihood function. The last column of tables 2.1
and 2.2 report the posterior mode of each parameter. I then use the random walk
Metropolis Hastings algorithm to draw from the posterior distributions. I store those
parameter draws and use them for simulation exercises discussed later.
49It corresponds to roughly a 24% reduction in the ratio of long-term bonds to short-term bonds.
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The Markov switching probabilities are well identified because, although the priors
are concentrated at their mean, the posterior modes of the transition probabilities are
very distinguishable from the prior means. The posterior distributions indicate that
the expected duration of staying in the normal regime is 24.15 quarters, and the
expected duration of staying in the ZIRP regime is 4.5 quarters. One may argue that
data seem to suggest that we have been in the ZIRP regime for at least 17 quarters
(from 2009Q1 to 2013Q1). There are two reasons why the estimated duration is
substantially shorter than this period. First, the data in my estimation stops at the
second quarter of 2010, by which there were only 6 quarters of zero interest rate policy.
Second, I treat the 8 quarters from 2002Q4 to 2004Q3 as a ZIRP regime (quarterly
FFR is less than 40 basis points) so that we have observations of exiting the ZIRP
regime. The time of staying in the ZIRP regime is also short here.
2.4.5 The Efficacy of the LSAPs in DSGE models
Having estimated the DSGE models, I abstract the filtered states, and, starting from
2010Q3, I simulate U.S. economy forward for 20 quarters under two scenarios. Under
the first scenario, there is no intervention from the central bank, and all the structural
shocks are zero. So, output should gradually go back to its long-term trend, and
inflation and interest rates should gradually go back to their steady states. Under
the second scenario, the economy is under the intervention of asset purchases by the
central bank simulated to mimic the Federal Reserve’s second round LSAPs, a $600
billion reduction of long-term debt in the hands of the private sector. The central
bank buys long-term bonds (in exchange for the short-term bonds) over the course of
the first four quarters, holds the ratio of the market value of the long-term bonds to
that of the short-term bonds constant for the next two years, and gradually reverts the
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LSAPs program over the final two years. Figure 2.1 illustrates the path of the ratio of
the market value of long-term bonds to that of the short-term bonds in the hands of
the private sector following the LSAPs by the central bank. In the regime-switching
bonds-in-utility model, this simulation is achieved by feeding the unanticipated shocks
to the bond supply rule 2.4. In the non-regime-switching bonds-in-utility model, with
a regular Taylor rule, agents have perfect knowledge of the bond purchases path, and
the equilibrium is solved by the PFRE solution method explained in section 2.3.2.
I simulate the LSAPs 500 times using the parameter draws from the posterior dis-
tributions and take the average of the predicted path. Figure 2.2 shows the predicted
path generated by the non-regime-switching bonds-in-utility model, and Figure 2.3
shows the predicted path generated by the regime-switching bonds-in-utility model50.
The red lines in those two figures are the predicted path without intervention, the
blue lines are the predicted path under the LSAPs, and the black dots are actual
observations. Output is per capita level data, while the units of the other variables
are percentage measured quarterly. It is clear from those figures that the effects of
the LSAPs are unlikely to be significant no matter what model we use, and whether
or not agents are taken by surprise. At each time point, I take the percentage differ-
ence of the macro variables between the path with and the path without the LSAPs
intervention, and sum up the difference over the 20 quarters to measure the total ef-
fects. The non-regime-switching bonds-in-utility DSGE model suggests on average51
the LSAPs increase output level by 0.34% and inflation by 0.16% over the course of
20 quarters. The regime-switching model suggests a slightly bigger effect, on average
the LSAPs increase output level by 1.03% and inflation by 0.25% over the course of
50Another complication in the simulation in the regime-switching DSGE model is that agents have
uncertainty over the future states. There are 2t possible states at time t. To maintain tractability, I
collide the states with similar history and only keep track of 16 states at each period (See Schorfheide
(2005) for how this can be achieved.). The predicted path of the macro variables plotted is thus the
probability weighted average of those 16 states.
51“On average” means average over parameter uncertainty.
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20 quarters. This finding agrees with the results reported by chapter 1. Section 3.2
investigate further why the effects of the LSAPs are so small measured in the DSGE
models and evaluate their effects with VARs.
2.4.6 The Efficacy of the ZIRP in DSGE models
Zero interest rate policy is effective in boosting output and inflation. Both of the
models considered suggest substantial effects of the ZIRP. When I simulate the U.S.
economy under the ZIRP for an extended period, I consider keeping interest rates at
zero for four quarters at the regime-switching model and keeping interest rates at the
2010Q2 level for four quarters in the model where the ZIRP is implemented by the
PFRE. In the regime-switching model, at each period, agents ex ante always attach
certain probability of exiting the ZIRP regime in the next period, and the ZIRP
regime is realized for four quarters ex post. In the PFRE model, agents know that
the ZIRP will be kept for four quarters. I choose fours quarters because although the
Federal Reserve announced on September 13th, 2012 that the ZIRP will last to “at
least mid-2015”, participants of the Blue Chip Survey, professionals and economists,
expected the ZIRP to last four or five quarters at the end of 2010 when the LSAPs
II were implemented. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show the predicted path under the
ZIRP generated by the PFRE model and the regime-switching model. The red lines
in those two figures are the predicted path without the ZIRP, the blue lines are the
predicted path with the ZIRP, and the black dots are actual observations. The regime-
switching bonds-in-utility DSGE model suggests on average the ZIRP increases output
level by 12.83% and inflation by 2.08% over the course of 20 quarters. The non-
regime-switching model where the ZIRP is implemented by the PFRE suggests a two
fold stronger effect on output level and five fold stronger stimulus to inflation: On
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average the ZIRP increases output level by 25.01% and inflation by 11.71% over the
course of 20 quarters. As mentioned earlier, those two models are fundamentally
different in how agents formulate expectations about the future monetary policy.
The central bank’s “extended period” language is treated as completely credible by
the agents in the PFRE model, while in the regime-switching model, agents ignore the
central bank’s forward guidance. Figure 2.6 compares the predicted path of inflation
generated by those two models. The red line is the predicted path from the regime-
switching model and the green line is the predicted path from the PFRE model. The
black dots are actual data. It demonstrates that actual path is a lot closer to the
path from the regime-switching model.
Figure 2.9 summarizes the effects of the LSAPs and the ZIRP in the DSGE models.
At each time of the simulated path, I take the percentage difference of the macro
variables with and without intervention, and sum up over 20 quarters. This figure
plots the total effects. The color green represents the bonds-in-utility model. The
squares are mean responses and the circles reflects the parameter uncertainty. The
blue square reports the mean effects measured in the market segmentation model
reported by chapter 1. This figure clearly shows that the effects of LSAPs are very
small, while the efficacy of ZIRP is substantial, and crucially depends on the models.
2.4.7 The Efficacy of the Combination of the LSAPs and the
ZIRP
Since the effects of the LSAPs alone is very small, unsurprisingly, the effects of the
combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP are dominated by the effects of the ZIRP.
Figure 2.7 (the PFRE model) and Figure 2.8 (the regime-switching model) shows that
the predictive paths of the macro variables under the ZIRP (blue lines) and under the
69
combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP (green lines) are almost indistinguishable
from each other52. Chapter 1 also emphasize the importance of the Federal Reserve’s
commitment to keep the interest rates at zero for an extended period.
2.5 Conclusions
Given the unusual size and scope of the unconventional monetary policies, it is critical
for economists to construct models capable of assessing their effectiveness and guiding
policy. This chapter develops a new approach to modeling the ZIRP, which not only
fits the macro data featuring a persistent period of extremely low interest rates, and
generates a predicted path closer to the actual path, but also provides a plausible
mechanism for modeling the exit of the zero interest rate policy. Also, by cross-
evaluation of the different models of the LSAPs and the ZIRP, I find that the Federal
Reserve’s commitment to an extended period of low interest rates is likely to be
effective in boosting the economy while the efficacy of LSAPs is uncertain.
52Red lines are the predictive path under no intervention and no shocks.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distribution for chapter 2: Structural Pa-
rameters.
Prior Posterior
Dist Mean Std Mode
400γ G 2.5 0.5 1.9263
400pi G 2.0 0.5 2.0711
400(β−1 − 1) G 1.0 0.25 0.8210
400ζ G 0.75 0.25 0.6633
ν G 2.0 0.5 0.5682
ζp B 0.5 0.1 0.9066
ρr B 0.7 0.1 0.7958
φpi G 1.5 0.25 1.8069
φy G 0.4 0.2 0.3261
P11 B 0.99 0.05 0.9586
P22 B 0.85 0.10 0.7793
ν˜ G 0.10 0.05 0.0797
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Table 2.2: Parameter Prior and Posterior Distribution for chapter 2: Shock Process
Parameters.
Prior Posterior
Dist Mean Std Mode
ρz B 0.4 0.2 0.1560
ρb B 0.75 0.1 0.7624
ρφ B 0.75 0.1 0.9694
ρB B 0.8 0.1 0.9154
ρζ B 0.8 0.1 0.9307
ρg B 0.75 0.1 0.9329
100σz IG1 0.5 4 0.5542
100σb IG1 0.5 4 1.5873
100σφ IG1 0.5 4 1.2965
100σB IG1 0.5 4 0.1162
100σm IG1 0.5 4 0.1646
100σζ IG1 0.5 4 0.3201
100σg IG1 0.5 4 4.2947
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Figure 2.1: Simulated path of the ratio of the market value of long term bonds to that
of the short-term bonds
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Figure 2.2: Simulate the U.S. economy forward from 2010Q3 under the LSAPs II
intervention in the NON-regime-switching bonds-in-utility DSGE model with standard
Taylor rule. The red lines show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables
without shocks and under no intervention. The blue lines show the mean of predicted
paths of the macro variables under the LSAPs II intervention generated by the same
model. The black dots are actual observations.
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Figure 2.3: Simulate the U.S. economy forward from 2010Q3 under the LSAPs II
intervention in the regime switching Bonds-in-utility DSGE model. The red lines
show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables without shocks and under no
intervention. The blue lines show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables
under the LSAPs II intervention generated by the same model. The black dots are
actual observations.
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Figure 2.4: Simulate the U.S. economy forward from 2010Q3 under the ZIRP inter-
vention implemented by the PFRE. The red lines show the mean of predicted paths
of the macro variables without shocks and under no intervention generated by the
bonds-in-utility DSGE models. The blue lines show the mean of predicted paths of
the macro variables under the ZIRP for four quarters generated by the same model.
The black dots are actual observations.
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Figure 2.5: Simulate the U.S. economy forward from 2010Q3 under the ZIRP inter-
vention in the regime switching bonds-in-utility DSGE model. The red lines show the
mean of predicted paths of the macro variables without shocks and under no interven-
tion. The blue lines show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables under
the ZIRP for four quarters generated by the same model. The black dots are actual
observations.
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Figure 2.6: Compare the predicted path of inflation generated by two different models
of ZIRP. Red represents regime switching model while green stands for PFRE model.
The black dots are actual observations.
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Figure 2.7: Simulate the U.S. economy forward from 2010Q3 under the ZIRP inter-
vention implemented by the PFRE and under the combination of the LSAPs and the
ZIRP. The red lines show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables without
shocks and under no intervention generated by the bonds-in-utility DSGE models.
The blue lines show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables under the
ZIRP for four quarters generated by the same model, and the green lines show the
predictive paths under the intervention of the combination of the LSAPs and the
ZIRP for four quarters. The black dots are actual observations.
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Figure 2.8: Simulate the U.S. economy forward from 2010Q3 under the ZIRP in-
tervention implemented by the regime-switching bonds-in-utility model and under the
combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP. The red lines show the mean of predicted
paths of the macro variables without shocks and under no intervention, the blue lines
show the mean of predicted paths of the macro variables under the ZIRP for four
quarters, and the green lines show the predictive paths under the intervention of the
combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP for four quarters. The black dots are actual
observations.
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Figure 2.9: Summary of effects of LSAPs and ZIRP in DSGE models. The squares
stand for mean effects and the circles reflect the uncertainty. Green represents bonds-
in-utility model and blue represents the results reported by chapter 1.
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Chapter 3
Assessing the Effects of
Large-Scale Asset Purchases in a
Zero-Interest-Rate Environment
through the Lens of VAR Models
3.1 Introduction
DSGE models impose strict cross-equation restrictions. I use VARs that relax the
DSGE model restrictions to further examine the reason for the small effects of LSAPs
measured in the DSGE models. I investigate how the effects of LSAPII are empirically
identified in the DSGE models that break the neutrality of the LSAP operation such
as chapter 1 and Harrison (2010). I ask the questions: What happens when you
relax some of the DSGE model restrictions? How do DSGE models compare to VAR
studies? Using the exogenous restrictions implied by the DSGE models, the estimated
VAR model suggests no evidence of positive effects of LSAP on output and inflation.
82
An estimated VAR with a further relaxation of DSGE restrictions can generate a
sizable effect of LSAPs but with considerable uncertainty.
3.2 The Efficacy of the LSAPs in VAR models
The DSGE models considered in this work impose a strong assumption on how LSAPs
are identified: Equation 2.4 shows that the bond supply follows an AR(1) process ex-
ogenously, and other structural shocks do not affect the dynamics of bonds. LSAPs
were never implemented before in U.S. history until the recent recession; however,
DSGE models use the covariance relationship between bonds and other macro vari-
ables in the historical data to “identify” the effects of the assets purchases to macro
variables. In the data, the variation of bonds in the past could be due to an entirely
different reason. It could be a demand shock. For example, by preferred habitat
theory, long-term interest rates could experience a large and long-lasting drop be-
cause of a demand shock of a long-maturity clientele such as pension funds, which
in turn would stimulate private borrowing and investment. This implies a positive
covariance between long-term bond quantity in the hands of the private sector and
macrovariables: opposite of the covariance relationship the LSAPs assume. Although
by construction the LSAPs should have a positive effect in DSGE models, the insignif-
icant effects found in the DSGE models are probably due to the identification strategy
of those models: the covariances between bonds and macro variables in the historical
data are not informative about the effectiveness of the LSAPs. To further investigate
how much of the finding that the effects of the LSAPs are small is due to the strict
restrictions imposed by the DSGE models, I compare the DSGE models with the
VARs. I ask the question, what are the effects of the LSAPs in an estimated VAR
using the identification restrictions imposed by the DSGE models? What happens if
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I further relax those restrictions?
3.2.1 VAR with Exogenous Restrictions
The assumption of the DSGE models that the bond supply follows an AR(1) process
exogenously, and other structural shocks do not affect the dynamics of bonds provides
an exogenous restriction to identify a bond supply shock in a VAR model. I estimate
the following VAR:
y1,t = Φ0 + Φ1yt−1 + Φ2yt−2 + Φ3yt−3 + Φ4yt−4 + Ψ (y2,t − C − ρBy2,t−1) + u1,t
y2,t = C + ρBy2,t−1 + σBεB,t
where y1,t are the growth rate of output, inflation, long rates, and short rates, and
y2,t is the ratio of the market value of the long bonds to that of the short bonds.
The definitions of those variables are described in section 2.4.2. u1,t are measurement
errors. εB,t is the bond supply shock. y1,t are affected by the bond supply shock, but
the bond supply is exogenous and unaffected by other macro variables. To simulate
the Federal Reserve’s second round LSAPs, I calibrate the bond shocks as described in
section 2.4.5. In order to assess the effects of ZIRP, I also identify a monetary policy
structural shock and impose ZIRP by unanticipated monetary policy shocks. I identify
this monetary policy shock by short-run restriction, that is, monetary authority shocks
do not affect the private sector’s activity on impact. Suppose the first two elements
of y1,t are the growth rate of output and inflation. Let Σu denote the variance and
covariance matrix of u1, and let Σtr denote the Cholesky decomposition of Σu. I draw
a unit length vector q, the first two elements of which equal zero. Σtr · q identifies the
impact of the monetary shock to the observables y1,t. Finally, I simulate the economy
forward with the estimated VAR model. Figure 3.1 shows the mean of the predicted
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path under no intervention or shocks, under the LSAPs, and under the ZIRP for
four quarters. The red line shows the predicted path of the macro variables under no
intervention and no shocks, where output is the per capita output level, inflation is the
quarterly percentage change of the core PCE, short rate is the quarterly federal funds
rate, and long rates are the quarterly rates for the 10-year Treasury constant maturity
bonds. The blue and green lines are the corresponding paths under the LSAPs and
the ZIRP. Figure 3.2 plots the mean and 90% Bayesian credible intervals of the
predicted path of macro variables under no intervention (red lines) and under the asset
purchase policy intervention (blue lines). Figure 3.3 plots the mean and 90% Bayesian
credible intervals of the predicted path of macro variables under no intervention (red
lines) and under the policy of keeping interest rates at the 2010Q2 level (0.048%) for
four quarters (blue lines). A comparison between the red and the blue lines shows
no evidence of a positive effect of the LSAPs, while ZIRP has a stimulative effect
(difference between the green line and the red line). This explains why the effects of
asset purchases measured in DSGE models are small. Asset purchases should have
positive effects in DSGE models by construction; however, data provide no evidence
of such restrictions imposed by DSGE models: Bond supply is an exogenous process
and asset purchases are identified as a supply shock. Figure 3.4 adds another grey line
on each panel of the Figure 3.1. This grey line on each panel represents the mean of
the predictive path of the corresponding macro variable under the intervention of the
combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP. Figure 3.5 adds Bayesian credible intervals
to Figure 3.4. The red lines show the mean and the 90% Bayesian credible intervals of
the predicted maco variables under no policy intervention, and the magenta-colored
lines plot the mean and the 90% Bayesian credible intervals of the predicted path of
the same macro variables under the policy intervention of both asset purchases and
keeping interest rates at the 2010Q2 level for four quarters. Unlike the case in DSGE
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models, the combination effects seem to be dominated by the effects of LSAPs since
in Figure 3.4 the grey line is very close to the blue line which is the predictive path
from the intervention of LSAPs only.
3.2.2 VAR with Sign Restrictions
The exogenous restriction is a very strong assumption. Whether or not it is valid
is subject to debate. The DSGE model also implies certain directional restrictions
of the responses of the macro variables to the LSAPs. The DSGE models imply
that the LSAPs reduce long-term rates, stimulate output and inflation. Those direc-
tional restrictions provide the sign restrictions to identify a risk premium shock of the
following VAR.
yt = Φ0 + Φ1yt−1 + Φ2yt−2 + Φ3yt−3 + Φ4yt−4 + ut,
where yt is a collection of the growth rate of output, inflation, short rates, and long
rates. I assume that the risk premium shock has zero impact on short-term rates,
reduces the long-term bond rates, and increases output and inflation on impact53. I
also calibrate the size of this shock so that the mean reduction of the long-term bond
rates on impact is 30 basis point, which lies in the mid-range of the values reported
by empirical studies of the effects of LSAPs. The monetary policy shock is identified
by sign restrictions. The monetary policy shock increases short and long rates on
impact, but decreases output growth rate and inflation on impact. This identification
scheme is very similar to Baumeister and Benati (2010) and Chen, Cu´rdia, and Ferrero
(2011) working paper. Baumeister and Benati (2010) use zero and sign restrictions
to identify a risk premium shock that decreases long rates by 1 percent, and Chen,
53The DSGE models suggest those sign restrictions. The empirical question is then, how big are
the effects of the policies.
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Cu´rdia, and Ferrero (2011) calibrate whatever size of the bond supply shock necessary
to decrease the long-term bond rates by 30 basis point on impact. Figure 3.6 shows
the simulation results of the same experiment: I simulate the economy forward under
no intervention and no shock, under the LSAPs, and under the ZIRP54. The red
line is the predicted path of the macro variables under no intervention, averaged
over different parameter draws from the posterior distributions. The blue line is the
predicted path of the macro variables under the LSAPs intervention, and the green
line is the predictive path under the ZIRP. The ZIRP has a substantial effect as
measured in the VAR model. There is potentially a positive effect of the LSAPs, but
it is considerably uncertain55. Figure 3.7 plots the estimate of the identified set of the
effects of the LSAPs. The red lines are the counterfactual scenario when there is no
policy intervention, while the blue lines are the mean and identified set of the predicted
path of the macro variables under the LSAPs II intervention. The effects of LSAPs
could be potentially substantial, but it is considerably uncertain. The green lines in
Figure 3.8 plot the mean and the identified set of the effects of ZIRP, while the red
lines are the mean and identified set of the predicted path of macro variables absent of
any policy intervention. Figure 3.9 adds another grey line on each panel of the Figure
3.6. This grey line on each panel represents the predictive path of the corresponding
macro variable under the intervention of the combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP.
It is interesting to notice that in the VAR model with sign restrictions the effects of
the combination of those two policies seem to be a weighted average of the LSAPs and
the ZIRP. The effects of ZIRP to output dominates the effects of LSAPs, while the
effects of the LSAPs to inflation dominated ZIRP. Figure 3.10 summarizes the effects
of the LSAPs and the ZIRP aggregate over 20 quarters. I take the log-difference of the
predicted macro variables with and without intervention at each time point and sum
54Here, ZIRP means keeping interest rates at the 2010Q2 (0.048%) level for four quarters
55See Figure 3.10 where the uncertainty is reflected by the ellipse in red.
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up over 20 quarters to reflect the total effects. The squares are the mean effects, and
the circles reflects the uncertainty of the parameter draws. The pink color represents
the results generated by the VAR with the exogenous restriction, while the red color
represents the results generated by the VAR with the sign restrictions. One reason
why the effects of the LSAPs and the ZIRP are considerably uncertain is the partial
identification of the sign restrictions.
3.3 Conclusions and Future Research
The identification assumption of the asset purchases in the DSGE models is particu-
larly strong. Estimated VAR using the exogenous restriction imposed by the DSGE
models suggests no evidence of a positive effect of asset purchases. This explains that
the small effects of asset purchases found by the DSGE models may be due to the
usage of the historical data to identify LSAPs as a supply shock. Estimated VAR with
further relaxed DSGE restrictions (using only sign restrictions implied by the DSGE
models) shows that asset purchases could potentially have a large effect on economy,
but the identification scheme adopted by this VAR prevents further sharpening of the
bounds of the effects.
Constructing DSGE models that are capable of correctly identifying the macro
effects of the unconventional monetary policy from macro data is critical not only to
assess the effectiveness of the policy but also to guide future exit strategies. Without
understanding the transmission mechanism of those unconventional monetary policy
to the macro economy, it is impossible to forecast how a future reversal in asset
purchases or a raise in policy rate can impact the economy, and thus advise when
the Federal Reserve should exit and how fast the pace of the sales of the assets
should be. Neither large-scale asset purchase nor near zero-interest-rate policy is a
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new experience. Japan has experienced near zero-interest-rate policy since 199956
and has adopted the “quantitative easing” policy between March 2001 and March
2006. Japan’s experience can provide economists valuable lessons to identify the
transmission mechanism of those unconventional monetary policy. This points to my
future research: using Japanese data to better identify the effect of asset purchases
and better estimate the Markov-switching probability of the policy regime in the
DSGE model. Japan also has experienced the exit of ZIRP twice, the abolishment
of the quantitative easing, and the removal of the excess bank reserves. Like Japan
before, the Federal Reserve now is running up an enormous balance sheet57 and facing
the uncertainty surrounding an exit strategy. Possibly, Japan before and the United
States now have something critical in common. Japan’s lesson will help forecast the
evolution of the the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet going forward and the economic
outlook.
Technically, the next step is to apply the perturbation method for Markov-switching
models proposed by Foerster, Rubio-Ramı´rez, Waggoner, and Zha (2012). This
method begins from the first principles and allows higher order approximation which
may be important when taking into account the risk of the long-term bonds.
56Japan has experienced three ZIRP episodes: 1999Q2-2000Q2, 2001Q1-2006Q1, and 2010Q4-
present.
57The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet stood at a record-large $3.189 trillion on March 20, 2013.
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Figure 3.1: VAR identified by the exogenous restriction. The red lines show the mean
of predicted path of the macro variables without shocks and under no intervention
generated by the estimated VAR model using the DSGE exogenous restriction iden-
tification. The blue lines show the mean of the predicted path of the macro variables
under the LSAPs II generated by the same VAR model. The green lines show the
mean of the predicted path ofthe macro variables under the ZIRP for four quarters
generated by the same VAR model.
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Figure 3.2: VAR identified by the exogenous restriction: effects of LSAPs. The red
lines show the mean and the 90% Bayesian credible intervals of predicted path of the
macro variables without shocks and under no intervention generated by the estimated
VAR model using the DSGE exogenous restriction identification. The blue lines show
the mean and the 90% Bayesian credible intervals of the predicted path of the macro
variables under the LSAPs II generated by the same VAR model.
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Figure 3.3: VAR identified by the exogenous restriction: effects of ZIRP. The red lines
show the mean and the 90% Bayesian credible intervals of predicted path of the macro
variables without shocks and under no intervention generated by the estimated VAR
model using the DSGE exogenous restriction identification. The green lines show the
mean and the 90% Bayesian credible intervals of the predicted path of the macro
variables under the policy of keep interest rates at the 2010Q2 level (0.048%) for 4
quarters generated by the same VAR model.
92
Figure 3.4: VAR identified by exogenous restrictions. The red lines show the mean
of predicted paths of the macro variables without shocks and under no intervention
generated by the estimated VAR model using the DSGE exogenous restriction identi-
fication. The blue lines show the mean of the predicted paths of the macro variables
under the LSAPs II generated by the same VAR model. The green lines show the
mean of the predicted path of the macro variables under the ZIRP for four quarters
generated by the same VAR model. The grey lines are the predictive paths under the
combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP.
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Figure 3.5: VAR identified by exogenous restrictions: combination of LSAPs and
ZIRP. The red lines show the mean and 90% Bayesian credible intervals of predicted
paths of the macro variables without shocks and under no intervention generated by
the estimated VAR model using the DSGE exogenous restriction identification. The
magenta lines are the mean and 90% Bayesian credible intervals of the predictive
paths under the combination of the LSAPs and the ZIRP.
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Figure 3.6: VAR identified by sign restrictions. The red line shows the mean of
predicted path of macro variables without shocks and under no intervention generated
by the estimated VAR model using the sign restriction identification. The blue line
shows the mean of the predicted path of macro variables under the LSAPs II generated
by the same VAR model. The green line shows the mean of the predicted path of
macro variables under the ZIRP for four quarters generated by the same VAR model.
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Figure 3.7: VAR identified by sign restrictions with identified set: effects of LSAPs.
The red lines show the mean and the identified set of predicted path of macro vari-
ables without shocks and under no intervention generated by the estimated VAR
model using the sign restriction identification. The blue lines show the mean and the
identified set of the predicted path of macro variables under the LSAPs II generated
by the same VAR model.
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Figure 3.8: VAR identified by sign restrictions with identified set: effects of ZIRP. The
red lines show the mean and the identified set of predicted path of macro variables
without shocks and under no intervention generated by the estimated VAR model
using the sign restriction identification. The green lines show the mean and identified
set of the predicted path of macro variables under the LSAPs II generated by the
same VAR model.
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Figure 3.9: VAR identified by sign restrictions. The red lines show the mean of pre-
dicted paths of macro variables without shocks and under no intervention generated
by the estimated VAR model using the sign restriction identification. The blue lines
show the mean of the predicted paths of the macro variables under the LSAPs II
generated by the same VAR model. The green lines show the mean of the predicted
paths of the macro variables under the ZIRP for four quarters generated by the same
VAR model. The grey lines are the predictive paths under the combination of the
LSAPs and the ZIRP.
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Figure 3.10: Summary of effects of LSAPs and ZIRP in DSGE models and VAR mod-
els. The squares stand for mean effects and the circles reflect the uncertainty. Green
represents bonds-in-utility model, blue represents the results reported by chapter 1,
pink represents the VAR with exogenous restrictions, and red represents the VAR
with sign restrictions
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Model
A.1.1 Final goods producers
The final good Yt is a composite made of a continuum of goods indexed by i ∈ (0, 1)
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λf di
]1+λf
. (A.1)
The final goods producers buy the intermediate goods on the market, package Yt,
and resell it to consumers. These firms maximize profits in a perfectly competitive
environment. Their problem is
maxYt,Yt(i) PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
s.t. Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λf di
]1+λf
(µf,t).
(A.2)
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The FOCs are
[∂Yt] : Pt = µf,t, (A.3)
[∂Yt(i)] : −Pt(i) + µf,t[
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λf di]λfYt(i)
− λf
1+λf = 0. (A.4)
Note that [∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λf di
]λf
= Y
λf
1+λf
t .
From the FOCs one obtains
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+λf
λf
Yt.
Combining this condition with the zero profit condition (because these firms operate
in a perfectly competitive market) one obtains the expression for the price of the
composite good
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
− 1
λf di
]−λf
. (A.5)
Note that the elasticity is
1+λf
λf
. λf = 0 corresponds to the linear case. λf → ∞
corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas case. We will constrain λf ∈ (0,∞).
A.1.2 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods producer i uses the following technology:
Yt(i) = Z
1−α
t Kt(i)
αLt(i)
1−α. (A.6)
The log of the growth rate of productivity zt = log
(
Zt/Zt−1
1+γ
)
follows the process
zt = ρzzt−1 + z,t, z,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2εz
)
, (A.7)
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The firm’s profit is given by:
Pt(i)Yt(i)−WtLt(i)−RktKt(i).
Cost minimization subject to (A.6) yields the conditions:
[∂Lt(i)] : Vt(i)(1− α)Z1−αt Kt(i)αLt(i)−α = Wt.
[∂Kt(i)] : Vt(i)αZ1−αt Kt(i)α−1Lt(i)1−α = Rkt .
where Vt(i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with A.6. In turn, these conditions
imply
Kt(i)
Lt(i)
=
α
1− α
Wt
Rkt
.
Note that if we integrate both sides of the equation with respect to i and define
Kt =
∫
Kt(i)di and Lt =
∫
Lt(i)di, we obtain a relationship between aggregate labor
and capital:
Kt =
α
1− α
Wt
Rkt
Lt. (A.8)
The marginal cost MCt is the same for all firms and equal to
MCt =
[
Wt +R
k
t
Kt(i)
Lt(i)
]
Z
−(1−α)
t
(
Kt(i)
Lt(i)
)−α
(A.9)
= α−α(1− α)−(1−α)W 1−αt
(
Rkt
)α
[(1 + γ) ezt ]−(1−α) .
Profits can then be expressed as (Pt(i)− λf,tMCt)Yt(i), where λf,t is a shock to the
time-varying price markup and is assumed to follow the exogenous process:
lnλf,t = ρλf lnλf,t−1 + λ,t, λ,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2ελ
)
. (A.10)
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Prices are sticky as in Calvo (1983). Specifically, each firm can readjust prices with
probability 1− ζp in each period. We depart from Calvo (1983) in assuming that for
those firms that cannot adjust prices, Pt(i) will increase at the steady state rate of
inflation pi. For those firms that can adjust prices, the problem is to choose a price
level P˜t(i) that maximizes the expected present discounted value of profits in all states
of nature where the firm is stuck with that price in the future:
max
P˜t(i)
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζspΞ
p
t+s
[
P˜t(i)Π
s − λf,t+sMCt+s
]
Yt+s(i) (A.11)
s.t. Yt+s(i) =
[
P˜t(i)Π
s
Pt+s
]− 1+λf
λf
Yt+s,
where Π ≡ 1 + pi, and Ξpt+s is today’s value of a future dollar for the average share-
holder. This variable is the appropriate discount factor of future dividends because we
assume that ownership of intermediate goods producing firms is equally distributed
among all households. The definition of average marginal utility is
Ξpt+s ≡
∑
j
ωjβ
s
jΞ
j,p
t+s,
where ωj represents the measure of type j in the population.
The FOC for the firm is:
0 = P˜t(i)Et
∞∑
s=0
ζspΞ
p
t+s
1
λf
Π
s
(
1− 1+λf
λf
)
P
1+λf
λf
t+s Yt+s (A.12)
−Et
∞∑
s=0
ζspΞ
p
t+s
1 + λf
λf
Π
−s 1+λf
λf P
1+λf
λf
t+s Yt+sλf,t+sMCt+s.
Note that all firms readjusting prices face an identical problem. We will consider
only the symmetric equilibrium in which all firms that can readjust prices will choose
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the same P˜t(i), so we can drop the i index from now on. From A.5 it follows that:
Pt =
[
(1− ζp)P˜
− 1
λf
t + ζp [ΠPt−1]
− 1
λf
]−λf
. (A.13)
A.1.3 Capital producers
There is a representative firm, owned by all households, that operates under perfect
competition, invests in capital, chooses utilization and rents it to intermediate firms.
By choosing the utilization rate ut, capital producers end up renting in each period t
an amount of “effective” capital equal to
Kt = utK¯t−1, (A.14)
and Rkt is the return per unit of effective capital. Utilization, however, subtracts real
resources measured in terms of the consumption good
a(ut)K¯t−1.
The law of motion of capital is
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 + µt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It, (A.15)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate and S(·) is the cost of adjusting investment,
with S ′(·) > 0 and S ′′(·) > 0.
Capital producers maximize expected discounted stream of dividends to their
104
shareholders:
max
K¯t,ut,It
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ωuβ
s
uΞ
p,u
t+s + ωrβ
s
rΞ
p,r
t+s)
[
Rkt+sut+sK¯t+s−1 − Pt+sa(ut+s)K¯t+s−1 − Pt+sIt+s
]
subject to the LOM of capital (A.15), with Qt the lagrange multiplier associated
with the constraint, and consider that the multiplier for time t + s constraint is
premultiplied by (ωuβ
s
uΞ
p,u
t+s + ωrβ
s
rΞ
p,r
t+s). FOC are:
[∂ut] : 0 = R
k
t − Pta′(ut) (A.16)[
∂K¯t
]
: Qt = Et
{
ωuβuΞ
p,u
t+1 + ωrβrΞ
p,r
t+1
ωuΞ
p,u
t + ωrΞ
p,r
t
[Rkt+1ut+1 − Pt+1a(ut+1) + (1− δ)Qt+1]
}
(A.17)
[∂It] : 0 = −1 + Qt
Pt
µt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
− Qt
Pt
µtS
′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
(A.18)
+Et
[(
ωuβuΞ
p,u
t+1 + ωrβrΞ
p,r
t+1
)
Pt+1
(ωuΞ
p,u
t + ωrΞ
p,r
t )Pt
Qt+1
Pt+1
µt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)(
It+1
It
)2]
A.1.4 Households
The key modification relative to the standard model is the introduction of long-term
bonds and segmentation. We follow the formulation in Woodford (2001) and consider
long-term bonds with coupon equal to κs paid at time t + 1 + s, for s ≥ 0. This
implies that the gross yield to maturity is given by
RL,t =
1
PL,t
+ κ (A.19)
or, equivalently, the price of such bond is given by
PL,t =
1
RL,t − κ. (A.20)
The duration of this bond is RL,t/ (RL,t − κ), which we will match to the average
duration of ten-year Treasury Bills. Notice also that the price of a bond issued s
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periods before is given by PL,t (s) = κ
sPL,t, which will be used to write the flow
budget constraint as a function of the stock of total long term debt, BLt , instead of
the current period’s purchases of long-term debt. As in standard models, short-term
assets Bt are one-period bonds, purchased at time t, which pay a nominal return Rt
at time t+ 1.
Households are ordered on a continuum of measure 1. A fraction ωu of households
(unrestricted, or u) trade in both short-term (one-period) and long-term (L-period)
bonds. The remaining fraction ωr = 1− ωu (restricted, or r) only trade in long-term
bonds. Additionally, unrestricted households pay a transaction cost ζt per-unit of
long-term bond purchased while restricted households do not.
The flow budget constraint differs depending on whether the household is unre-
stricted or restricted. For an unrestricted household who can trade both short and
long-term bonds, we have
PtC
u
t +B
u
t +(1+ζt)PL,tB
L,u
t ≤ Rt−1But−1+
∞∑
s=1
κs−1BL,ut−s+W
u
t (i)L
u
t (i)+Pt+Pcpt +Pfit −Tut , (A.21)
where ζtPL,tB
L,u
t is paid to the financial institution who redistributes the proceeds
Pfit to the household. For a restricted household who can only trade in long-term
securities but does not pay transaction costs, we have
PtC
r
t + PL,tB
L,r
t ≤
∞∑
s=1
κs−1BL,rt−s +W
r
t (i)L
r
t (i) + Pt + Pcpt + Pfit − T rt . (A.22)
In equations (A.21) and (A.22), Pt is the price of the final consumption good, W
j
t (i)
is the wage set by a household of type j = {u, r} who supplies labor of type i, Pt and
Pcpt are profits from ownership of intermediate goods producers and capital producers
respectively, and T jt are lump-sum taxes.
One advantage of assuming that the entire stock of long-term government bonds
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consists of perpetuities of this type is that the price in period t of a bond issued s
periods ago, PL,t (s), is a function of the coupon and the current price:
PL,t (s) = κ
sPL,t.
This relation allows us to rewrite the household budget constraint in a more convenient
recursive formulation. One bond of this type that has been issued s− 1 periods ago
is equivalent to κs−1 new bonds. By no arbitrage at time t− 1
PL,t−1BLt−1 =
∞∑
s=1
PL,t (s)B
L
t−s
PL,t−1BLt−1 =
∞∑
s=1
PL,t−1κs−1BLt−s
BLt−1 =
∞∑
s=1
κs−1BLt−s
at time t, BLt−1 is worth B
L
t−1 (1 + κPL,t) = B
L
t−1
(
1 + κ
RL,t−κ
)
= PL,tRL,tB
L
t−1.
The budget constraint of an unrestricted household becomes
PtC
u
t +B
u
t + (1 + ζt)PL,tB
L,u
t ≤ Rt−1But−1 + PL,tRL,tBL,ut−1 +Wut (i)Lut (i) + Put + Pcpt + Pfit − Tut .
(A.23)
For a restricted household we have
PtC
r
t + PL,tB
L,r
t ≤ PL,tRL,tBL,rt−1 +W rt (i)Lrt (i) + Pt + Pcpt + Pfit − T rt , (A.24)
where RL,t is the gross yield to maturity at time t on the long-term bond
58 and we
have
RL,t =
1
PL,t
+ κ.
58We match the duration of this bond (RL,t/ (RL,t − κ)) to the average duration of ten-year U.S.
Treasury Bills.
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Household j consumption-saving decisions are then the result of the maximization
of (A.25) subject to (A.23) if j = u or (A.24) if j = r.
Households enjoy consumption Cj,t and dislike hours worked Lj,t. The objective
function for all households is
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsj bj,t+s

(
Cjt+s
Zt+s
− hC
j
t+s−1
Zt+s−1
)1−σj
1− σj −
ϕjt+sL
j
t+s (i)
1+ν
1 + ν
 , (A.25)
where j = {u, r}, βj ∈ (0, 1) is the individual discount factor (which may differ
between restricted and unrestricted households), σj > 0 is the individual coefficient of
relative risk aversion (which may also differ between the different types of households),
ν ≥ 0 is the inverse elasticity of labor supply, bjt is a preference shock to individual j,
and ψt is a labor supply shock.
Define Ξp,ut as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (A.23)
and Ξp,rt the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (A.24). House-
holds perfectly share their consumption within their groups (restricted and unre-
stricted). This assumption implies that the multipliers Ξp,ut and Ξ
p,r
t are the same for
all households of a certain type in all periods and across all states of nature.
The first order conditions for consumption and bond holdings for an unrestricted
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household are
[∂Cut ] :
1
Pt
{
but
Zt
(
Cut
Zt
− hC
u
t−1
Zt−1
)−σu
−βuhEt
[
but+1
Zt
(
Cut+1
Zt+1
− hC
u
t
Zt
)−σu]}
= Ξp,ut , (A.26)
[∂Bt (u)] :Ξ
p,u
t = βuRtEt[Ξ
p,u
t+1], (A.27)[
∂BLt (u)
]
:
1 + ζt
RL,t − κΞ
p,u
t = βuEt
[
RL,t+1
RL,t+1 − κΞ
p,u
t+1
]
. (A.28)
The first order conditions for consumption and bond holdings for a restricted
household are
[∂Ct (r)] :
1
Pt
{
brt
Zt
(
Crt
Zt
− hC
r
t−1
Zt−1
)−σr
−βrhEt
[
brt+1
Zt
(
Crt+1
Zt+1
− hC
r
t
Zt
)−σr]}
= Ξp,rt , (A.29)
[
∂BLt (r)
]
:
1
RL,t − κΞ
p,r
t = βrEt
[
RL,t+1
RL,t+1 − κΞ
p,r
t+1
]
. (A.30)
Households are monopolistic suppliers of labor inputs Lt (i), which perfectly com-
petitive labor agencies aggregate into a homogenous labor composite Lt according to
the technology
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
1
1+λw di
]1+λw
, (A.31)
where λw ≥ 0 is the steady state wage markup. The first order condition for the
demand of labor input i is
Lt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)− 1+λw
λw
Lt. (A.32)
Combining this condition with the zero profit condition for labor agencies we obtain
109
an expression for the aggregate wage index Wt as a function of the wage specific to
the ith labor input
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
− 1
λw di
]−λw
. (A.33)
Household members set wages on a staggered basis (Calvo (1983)) subject to the
demand for their specific labor input (A.32). The wage gets reset with probability
1−ζw in each period, while with the complementary probability the wage grows at the
steady state rate of inflation and productivity. Formally, the problem for a household
member i of type j who can reset her wage at time t is
min
W˜ jt (i)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζwβj)
sbjt+s
ϕjt+s
1 + νj
Ljt+s(i)
1+νj (A.34)
subject to the budget constraint (A.23) or (A.24), the demand for labor (A.32) and
the wage updating scheme
W jt+s(i) = (Πe
γ)s W˜ jt (i). (A.35)
The first order condition for this problem is
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζwβj)
sΞp,jt+sL
j
t+s(i)
[
(Πeγ)sW˜ jt (i)− (1 + λw)
bjt+sϕ
j
t+sL
j
t+s(i)
νj
Ξp,jt+s
]
= 0. (A.36)
In the absence of nominal rigidities, this condition would amount to setting the real
wage as a markup over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure.
All agents of type j = u, r resetting their wage face an identical problem. We
focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which all agents of type j that can readjust
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their wage choose the same W˜ jt , in which case we get
(
W˜ jt
)1+ 1+λw
λw
νj
= (1 + λw)
Et
∑∞
s=0(ζwβj)
sbjt+sϕ
j
t+s (Πe
γ)−s
1+λw
λw
(1+νj) W
1+λw
λw
(1+νj)
t+s L
1+νj
t+s
Et
∑∞
s=0(ζwβj)
sΞp,jt+s (Πe
γ)s(1−
1+λw
λw
)W
1+λw
λw
t+s Lt+s
(A.37)
for j = u, r.
Therefore, the aggregate wage index (A.33) can be written as
Wt =
[
(1− ζw)
(
ωu
(
W˜ ut
)− 1
λw
+ ωr
(
W˜ rt
)− 1
λw
)
+ ζw(Πe
γWt−1)
− 1
λw
]−λw
. (A.38)
A.1.5 Government Policies
The central bank follows a conventional feedback interest rate rule (Taylor (1993))
with smoothing:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρm [(Πt
Π
)φpi (Yt/Yt−4
e4γ
)φy]1−ρm
em,t ,
where ρm ∈ (0, 1), φpi > 1 and φy ≥ 0.
The presence of long-term bonds modifies the standard government budget con-
straint
Bt + PL,tB
L
t = Rt−1,tBt−1 + (1 + κPL,t)B
L
t−1 + PtGt − Tt. (A.39)
The left-hand side of expression (A.39) is the market value, in nominal terms, of the
total amount of bonds (short-term and long-term) issued by the government at time
t. The right-hand side features the cost of servicing bonds maturing at time t as well
as spending Gt and taxes Tt.
We assume that the government controls the supply of long-term bond following
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a simple autoregressive rule
PL,tB
L
t
PtZt
= S
(
PL,t−1BLt−1
Pt−1Zt−1
)ρB
eB,t , (A.40)
where ρB ∈ (0, 1) and B,t is an i.i.d. exogenous shock. S is whatever constant needed
to make the above equation an identity at the steady state. We interpret LSAP
programs as shocks to the outstanding government long-term liabilities compared to
the historical behavior of these series.
Finally, we set taxes according to the feedback rule
Tt
PtZt
− Gt
Zt
≡ Φz,t = Φ
(
1
RL,t−1−κB
L
Z,t−1 +BZ,t−1
1
RL−κB
L
Z +BZ
)φT
eT,t , (A.41)
where T,t follows a stationary AR(1) process and the term in parenthesis on the right
hand side is the ratio of total debt value in period t to its steady state value.
A.1.6 Term Premium and Preferred Habitat
Our baseline formulation of the relation between transaction costs and the quantity
of debt is
ζt =
(
PL,tB
L
t
PtZt
)ρζ
exp (ζ,t) .
The Euler Equation of an unrestricted household for investing in long-term bonds
is
(1 + ζt)PL,tΞ
p,u
t = βuEt
(
PL,t+1RL,t+1Ξ
p,u
t+1
)
. (A.42)
Define PEHL,t and R
EH
L,t the price and yield to maturity of the long-term bond that
would arise in the absence of transaction costs, holding constant the path for the
marginal utility of consumption. In defining REHL,t , we also adjust the parameter κ so
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that in steady state the counterfactual long-term bond has the same maturity of the
bond in the model with transaction costs, that is
DL =
RL
RL − κ =
REHL
REHL − κEH
= DEHL . (A.43)
The counterpart of equation (A.42) in this counterfactual world is
PEHL,t Ξ
p,u
t = βuEt
(
PEHL,t+1R
EH
L,t+1Ξ
p,u
t+1
)
. (A.44)
No arbitrage implies that the counterfactual long-term bond should have the same
risk-adjusted return as the long-term bond in the actual economy with transaction
costs. Rearranging (A.42) and (A.44) and taking the difference yields
Et
{
Ξp,ut+1
Ξp,ut
[
PL,t+1
(1 + ζt)PL,t
RL,t+1 −
PEHL,t+1
PEHL,t
REHL,t+1
]}
= 0.
Up to a first order approximation, the previous equation becomes
Et
[
PˆL,t+1 − PˆL,t − ζt + RˆL,t+1 − (PˆEHL,t+1 − PˆEHL,t + RˆEHL,t+1)
]
= 0.
Also up to the first order, from equation (A.43) the relation between price and yields
is
PˆL,t = −DLRˆL,t.
We define the risk premium as the difference, in log-deviations from steady state, of
the yield to maturity with and without transaction costs
R̂P t ≡ RˆL,t − RˆEHL,t .
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We can then combine the approximation of the no arbitrage condition and the relation
between price and yield to obtain a first-order forward looking difference equation in
the risk premium
(DL − 1)EtR̂P t+1 −DLR̂P t + ζt = 0.
Because DL > 1, the previous equation can be solved forward to obtain
R̂P t =
1
DL
∞∑
s=0
(
DL − 1
DL
)s
Etζt+s,
which corresponds to the equation in the text.
A.1.7 Aggregation
Resource constraints
Budget constraint for the unconstrained household is
PtC
u
t +B
u
t +
1 + ζt
RL,t − κB
L,u
t = Rt−1B
u
t−1 +
RL,t
RL,t − κB
L,u
t−1 +
∫
Wut (i)L
u
t (i) + Pt + Pcpt + Pfit − Tut
Budget constraint for the constrained household is
PtC
r
t +
1
RL,t − κB
L,r
t =
RL,t
RL,t − κB
L,r
t−1 +
∫
W rt (i)L
r
t (i) + Pt + Pcpt + Pfit − T rt
Government’s budget constraint is
Bt +
1
RL,t − κB
L
t = Rt−1Bt−1 +
RL,t
RL,t − κB
L
t−1 + PtGt − Tt
Next, realize that
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P =
∫
t
P (i) di =
∫
Pt (i)Yt (i) di−WtLt −RKt Kt,
where Lt =
∫
Lt (i) di is total labor supplied by the labor packers and demanded by
the firms. Kt =
∫
Kt (i) di. We plug the definition of Πt into household’s budget
constraints and realize that the profit of labor packer and good packer is zero.
It must be the case that
WtLt =
∫
W ut (i)L
u
t (i) di+
∫
W rt (i)L
r
t (i) di
and
PtYt =
∫
Pt (i)Yt (i) di.
The capital producer’s profit is
RKt Kt − Pta (ut) K¯t−1 − PtIt.
The financial institution’s profit is
Pfit = $u
ζt
RL,t − κB
L,u
t .
Finally the budget constraint is
$uC
u
t +$rC
r
t +Gt + a (ut) K¯t−1 + It = Yt. (A.45)
Exogenous Processes
The model is supposed to be fitted to data on output, consumption, investment,
employment, wages, nominal interest rates and market value of bonds.
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• Technology process: let zt = ln (e−γZt/Zt−1)
zt = ρzzt + z,t (A.46)
• Preference for leisure:
lnϕt = ρϕ lnϕt−1 + ϕ,t (A.47)
• Price Mark-up shock:
lnλf,t = λ,t (A.48)
• Capital adjustment cost process:
lnµt = ρµ lnµt−1 + µ,t (A.49)
• Intertemporal preference shifter:
ln bt = ρb ln bt−1 + b,t (A.50)
• Government spending process:
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + g,t (A.51)
• Monetary Policy Shock m,t.
• Exogenous risk premium shock:
ζ,t = ρζζ,t−1 + ζ,t (A.52)
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• Fiscal shock T,t
• Long-term bond supply shock B,t
A.2 Normalized Equations
Consider the following normalizations:
• rkt ≡ R
k
t
Pt
; wz,t ≡ WtZtPt ; mct ≡ MCtPt ; qt ≡
Qt
Pt
• Ξjt ≡ Ξpt (j)ZtPt, ∀j
• xz,t ≡ xt/Zt, ∀xt, except for the cases below
• Bz,t ≡ BtPtZt ; BLz,t ≡
BLt
PtZt
; Gz,t ≡ GtZt ; Tz.t ≡ TtPtZt
Real marginal cost
mct = α
−α(1− α)−(1−α) (rkt )αw1−αz,t (A.53)
Capital demand
Kz,t =
α
1− α
wz,t
rkt
Lt (A.54)
Technology
Yz,t = K
α
z,tL
1−α
t (A.55)
price setting
p˜t =
ωuX
n,u
t + ωrX
n,r
t
ωuX
d,u
t + ωrX
d,r
t
(A.56)
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with
Xpn,jt = Ξ
j
tYz,t (1 + λf )λf,tmct + βjζpEt
(Πt+1
Π
) 1+λf
λf
Xpn,jt+1
 , j = u, r(A.57)
Xpd,jt = Ξ
j
tYz,t + βjζpEt
[(
Πt+1
Π
) 1
λf
Xpd,jt+1
]
, j = u, r (A.58)
LOM prices
1 = (1− ζp)
(
ωuX
pn,u
t + ωrX
pn,r
t
ωuX
pd,u
t + ωrX
pd,r
t
)− 1
λf
+ ζp
(
Π
Πt
)− 1
λf
(A.59)
Effective capital
Kz,t = e
−γ−ztutK¯z,t−1 (A.60)
Law of motion of capital
K¯z,t = (1− δ) e−γ−ztK¯z,t−1 + µt
[
1− S
(
eγ+zt
Iz,t
Iz,t−1
)]
Iz,t (A.61)
capital utilization
rkt = a
′(ut) (A.62)
Law of motion of Q
qt = Et
{
ωuβuΞ
u
t+1 + ωrβrΞ
r
t+1
ωuΞut + ωrΞ
r
t
e−γ−zt+1 [rkt+1ut+1 − a(ut+1) + (1− δ) qt+1]
}
(A.63)
Investment decision
0 = −1 + qtµt
[
1− S
(
eγ+zt
Iz,t
Iz,t−1
)]
− qtµtS′
(
eγ+zt
Iz,t
Iz,t−1
)
eγ+zt
Iz,t
Iz,t−1
(A.64)
+Et
[
ωuβuΞ
u
t+1 + ωrβrΞ
r
t+1
ωuΞut + ωrΞ
r
t
e−γ−zt+1qt+1µt+1S′
(
eγ+zt+1
Iz,t+1
Iz,t
)(
eγ+zt+1
Iz,t+1
Iz,t
)2]
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Marginal Utilities for each type
Ξjt = b
j
t
(
Cjz,t − hCjz,t−1
)−σj − βjhEt [bjt+1 (Cjz,t+1 − hCjz,t)−σj] , j = u, r (A.65)
Euler equation: Unconstrained, short
Ξut = βuRtEt[e−γ−zt+1Ξut+1Π−1t+1] (A.66)
Euler equation: Unconstrained, long
(1 + ζt) Ξ
u
t = βuEt
[
Ξut+1e
−γ−zt+1Π−1t+1
RL,t − κ
RL,t+1 − κRL,t+1
]
(A.67)
Euler equation: Constrained, long
Ξrt = βrEt
[
Ξrt+1e
−γ−zt+1Π−1t+1
RL,t − κ
RL,t+1 − κRL,t+1
]
(A.68)
Wage setting (
w˜jz,t
)1+ 1+λwλw νj
=
Xwn,jt
Xwd,jt
, j = u, r (A.69)
Xwn,jt = (1 + λw) b
j
tϕ
j
tL
1+νj
t w
1+λw
λw
(1+νj)
z,t + ζwβjEt
[(
Πt+1e
zt+1
Π
) 1+λw
λw
(1+νj)
Xwn,jt+1
]
, j = u, r(A.70)
Xwd,jt = Ξ
j
tLtw
1+λw
λw
z,t + ζwβjEt
[(
Πt+1e
zt+1
Π
) 1
λw
Xwd,jt+1
]
, j = u, r (A.71)
Law of motion of real wages
wz,t =
(1− ζw)
ωu(Xwn,ut
Xwd,ut
)− 1λw 11+ 1+λw
λw
νu
+ ωr
(
Xwn,rt
Xwd,rt
)− 1λw 11+ 1+λw
λw
νr
+ ζw (Πwz,t−1
Πtezt
)− 1λw −λw
(A.72)
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Budget constraint
Bz,t +
1
RL,t − κB
L
z,t =
Rt−1
eγ+ztΠt
Bz,t−1 +
RL,t
RL,t − κ
1
eγ+ztΠt
BLz,t−1 +Gz,t − Tz,t (A.73)
Long term bond policy
PL,tB
L
z,t = S
(
PL,t−1BLz,t−1
)ρB eB,t (A.74)
Transfers feedback rule
Tz,t −Gz,t ≡ Φz,t = Φ
(
1
RL,t−1−κB
L
Z,t−1 +BZ,t−1
1
RL−κB
L
Z +BZ
)φT
expT,t (A.75)
Monetary policy
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρm [(Πt
Π
)φpi ( Yz,t
Yz,t−4
ezt−3+...+zt
)φy]1−ρm
em,t (A.76)
Term premium
ζt ≡ ζ(PL,tBLz,t, ζ,t) (A.77)
Aggregate resources constraint
ωuC
u
z,t + ωrC
r
z,t + Iz,t +Gz,t + e
−γ−zta(ut)K¯z,t−1 = Yz,t (A.78)
A.3 Model Steady State
In steady state, the log of productivity grows at the constant rate γ and inflation is
constant and equal to Π.
We choose a functional form for a(ut) such that u = 1 in steady state and a(1) = 0
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(Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2009)). Furthermore we consider
Yz = 1,
νu = νr = ν,
S (eγ) = S ′ (eγ) = 0,
and estimate
Cu
Cr
,
Ξu
Ξr
and let the levels of bu and br be whatever they need to be to allow these ratios to be
consistent with each other and the resources constraint in levels.
Euler equations imply
1 = βuRe
−γΠ−1, (A.79)
(1 + ζ) =
RL
R
, (A.80)
βu = βr (1 + ζ) . (A.81)
Risk premium relation determines level of long debt
BLMVz = ζ
−1 (ζ) . (A.82)
Govt BC determines taxes
Tz = Gz −
(
1− β−1u
)
Bz −
(
1
RLL − κ
− R
L
L
RLL − κ
1
eγΠ
)
BLz . (A.83)
Unit MEI shock implies
1 = q. (A.84)
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Unit utilization implies
rk = a′(1), (A.85)
which pins down a′(1) given rk.
FOC for investment implies
rk = β¯−1eγ − (1− δ), (A.86)
with
β¯ ≡ ωuβuΞ
u + ωrβrΞ
r
ωuΞu + ωrΞr
=
ωuβu
Ξu
Ξr
+ ωrβr
ωu
Ξu
Ξr
+ ωr
,
which is a function of Ξu/Ξr. Hence rk is also known given the estimate/calibration
of Ξu/Ξr.
Price setting implies
mc =
1
1 + λf
. (A.87)
Definition of marginal cost implies
wz = w˜z
(
rk
)− α
1−α , (A.88)
with
w˜z ≡ (1 + λf )−
1
1−α α
α
1−α (1− α) .
Technology function implies
L = K
− α
1−α
z , (A.89)
and plugging A.89 into capital demand implies
Kz = K˜z
(
rk
)−1
, (A.90)
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with
K˜z =
α
1 + λf
,
which then implies that
L = L˜
(
rk
) α
1−α , (A.91)
with
L˜ ≡
(
α
1 + λf
)− α
1−α
.
Effective capital is
K¯z = e
γK˜z
(
rk
)−1
. (A.92)
Investment is
Iz = [e
γ − (1− δ)] K˜z
(
rk
)−1
(A.93)
Resources constraint is
ωuC
u
z + ωrC
r
z = 1− Iz −Gz (A.94)
and given the ratio of consumptions, we get
Crz =
1− Iz −Gz
ωu
Cuz
Crz
+ ωr
, (A.95)
Cuz =
Cuz
Crz
Crz . (A.96)
Further notice that
Xpn,u
Xpn,r
=
Xpd,u
Xpd,r
=
Ξu
Ξr
1− βrζp
1− βuζp , (A.97)
which is known.
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For the wages, we have
Xwn,j
Xwd,j
= (1 + λw)L
νw
1+λw
λw
ν
z
bjϕj
Ξj
and in the log-linearization, we will need the ratio
Xwn,u
Xwd,u
Xwn,r
Xwd,r
=
buϕu
brϕr
Ξr
Ξu
(A.98)
or
χwu =
ωu
ωu + ωr
(
buϕu
brϕr
Ξr
Ξu
) 1
λw
1
1+1+λw
λw
ν
which, given bu/br and Ξu/Ξr is given by ϕu/ϕr. Let us then estimate/calibrate this
ratio, χwu, which has to be between 0 and 1.
Rest of steady state relations (not explicitly needed for the numerical analysis)
are
Xpn,j =
ΞjYz (1 + λf )mc
1− βjζp , j = u, r, (A.99)
Xpd,j =
ΞjYz
1− βjζp , j = u, r, (A.100)
Ξj = bj(1− βjh)(1− h)−σj(Cjz)−σj , j = u, r, (A.101)
Xwn,j = (1 + λw)
bjϕjL1+νjw
1+λw
λw
(1+ν)
z
1− ζwβj , j = u, r, (A.102)
Xwd,j =
ΞjLw
1+λw
λw
z
1− ζwβj , j = u, r, (A.103)
wz =
[
ωu
(
Xwn,u
Xwd,u
)− 1
λw
1
1+1+λw
λw
ν
+ ωr
(
Xwn,r
Xwd,r
)− 1
λw
1
1+1+λw
λw
ν
]−λw
. (A.104)
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A.4 Log-linear Approximation
Consider in general that
xˆt ≡ ln (xt/x)
for any variable x, except for ζˆt ≡ ln
(
1+ζt
1+ζ
)
, rt ≡ ln (Rt/R), and rL,t ≡ ln (RL,t/RL)
Real marginal cost
m̂ct = αrˆ
k
t + (1− α) wˆz,t (A.105)
Capital demand
Kˆz,t = wˆz,t − rˆkt + Lˆt (A.106)
Technology
Yˆz,t = αKˆz,t + (1− α)Lˆt (A.107)
price setting
Xˆpn,jt = (1− βjζp)
(
Ξˆjt + Yˆz,t + λˆf,t + m̂ct
)
+ βjζpEt
[
1 + λf
λf
pit+1 + Xˆ
pn,j
t+1
]
,
Xˆpd,jt = (1− βjζp)
(
Ξˆjt + Yˆz,t
)
+ βjζpEt
[
1
λf
pit+1 + Xˆ
pd,j
t+1
]
, j = u, r.
LOM prices
pit =
1− ζp
ζp
[
χpuXˆ
pn,u
t + (1− χpu) Xˆpn,rt − χpuXˆpd,ut − (1− χpu) Xˆpd,rt
]
, (A.108)
with
χpu ≡ ωu
ωu + ωr
1−βuζp
1−βrζp
(
Ξu
Ξr
)−1 .
Effective capital
Kˆz,t = −zt + uˆt + ˆ¯Kz,t−1. (A.109)
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Law of motion of capital
ˆ¯Kz,t = (1− δ)e−γ( ˆ¯Kz,t−1 − zt) + [1− (1− δ)e−γ](µˆt + Iˆz,t). (A.110)
Capital utilization
rˆkt =
a′′(1)
rk
uˆt. (A.111)
Law of motion of Q
qˆt = β¯e
−γEt
[
rkrˆkt+1 + (1− δ) qˆt+1
]− Etzˆt+1 (A.112)
+Et
[
qu
(
1 + ζ
1 + quζ
Ξˆut+1 − Ξˆut
)
+ (1− qu)
(
1
1 + quζ
Ξˆrt+1 − Ξˆrt
)]
,
with
qu ≡ ωuΞ
u
ωuΞu + ωrΞr
=
(
β¯
βr
− 1
)
ζ−1.
Investment decisions
0 = qˆt + µˆt − e2γS ′′
(
zˆt + Iˆz,t − Iˆz,t−1
)
+ β¯e2γS ′′Et
[
zt+1 + Iˆz,t+1 − Iˆz,t
]
. (A.113)
Marginal Utilities for each type:
Ξˆjt =
1
1− βjh
[(
bˆjt − βjhEtbˆjt+1
)
− σj
1− h
{
(1 + βjh
2)Cˆjz,t − βjhEtCˆjz,t+1 − hCˆjz,t−1
}]
, j = u, r.
(A.114)
Euler equation: Unconstrained, short
Ξˆut = rt + Et(Ξˆut+1 − zt+1 − pit+1). (A.115)
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Euler equation: Unconstrained, long
ζˆt + Ξˆ
u
t =
RL
RL − κrL,t + Et
[
Ξˆut+1 − zt+1 − pit+1 −
κ
RL − κrL,t+1
]
. (A.116)
Euler equation: Constrained, long
Ξˆrt =
RL
RL − κrL,t + Et
[
Ξˆrt+1 − zt+1 − pit+1 −
κ
RL − κrL,t+1
]
. (A.117)
Wage setting
Xˆwn,jt = (1− ζwβj)
[
bˆjt + ϕˆ
j
t + (1 + ν)Lˆt +
(
1 + λw
λw
)
(1 + ν)wˆz,t
]
+ ζwβjEt
[
1 + λw
λw
(1 + ν)(pit+1 + zt+1) + Xˆ
wn,j
t+1
]
, j = u, r, (A.118)
Xˆwd,jt = (1− ζwβj)
[
Ξˆjt + Lˆt +
1 + λw
λw
wˆz,t
]
+ ζwβjEt
[
1
λw
(pit+1 + zt+1) + Xˆ
wd,j
t+1
]
, j = u, r. (A.119)
Law of motion of real wages
wˆz,t = (1− ζw) 1
1 + 1+λwλw ν
[
χwu
(
Xˆwn,ut − Xˆwd,ut
)
+ (1− χwu)
(
Xˆwn,r − Xˆwd,r
)]
(A.120)
+ζw (wˆz,t−1 − pit − zt) ,
with
χwu =
ωu
ωu + ωrw
1
λw+(1+λw)ν
ur
.
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Budget constraint:
Bˆz,t +
BLz /Bz
RL − κBˆ
L
z,t = β
−1
u
(
Bˆz,t−1 + rt−1
)
+
BLz /Bz
RL − κβ
−1
r Bˆ
L
z,t−1 (A.121)
+
(1− e−γΠ−1κ)RL
RL − κ
BLz /Bz
RL − κrL,t
+
Gz
Bz
Gˆz,t − Yz
Bz
Tˆz,t −
(
β−1u +
BLz /Bz
RL − κβ
−1
r
)
(zt + pit) ,
with
Tz,t ≡ Tz + YzTˆz,t ⇒ Tˆz,t = Tz,t
Yz
− Tz
Yz
.
Long term bond policy
− RL
RL − κrL,t + Bˆ
L
z,t = ρB(−
RL
RL − κrL,t−1 + Bˆ
L
z,t−1) + B,t. (A.122)
Transfers feedback rule
Tˆz,t −GzGˆz,t
Tz −Gz = φT
Bˆz,t−1 + 1RL−κ (BLz /Bz) BˆLz,t−1 − RL(RL−κ)2 (BLz /Bz)rL,t−1
1 + 1
RL−κ(B
L
z /Bz)
+ T,t.
(A.123)
Monetary policy:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr)
[
φpipit + φy
(
Yˆz,t − Yˆz,t−4 +
3∑
i=0
zt−1
)]
+ m,t. (A.124)
Term premium:
ζˆt = ζ
′BˆLz,t + ζ,t. (A.125)
Aggregate resources constraint
Yˆz,t =
ωuC
u
z
Yz
Cˆuz,t +
ωrC
r
z
Yz
Cˆrz,t +
Iz
Yz
Iˆz,t +
Gz
Yz
Gˆz,t + e
−γrk
K¯z
Yz
uˆt. (A.126)
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A.5 Data
We use quarterly data for the United States from the third quarter of 1987 (1987q3) to
the third quarter of 2009 (2009q3) for the following seven series: real GDP per capita,
hours worked, real wages, core personal consumption expenditures deflator, nominal
effective Federal Funds rate, the 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield, and the
ratio between long-term and short-term U.S. Treasury debt. All data are extracted
from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) maintained by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. The mapping of these variables to the states is
∆Y obst = 100(γ + Yˆz,t − Yˆz,t−1 + zˆt),
Lobst = 100
(
L+ Lˆt
)
,
∆wobst = 100(γ + wˆz,t − wˆz,t−1 + zˆt),
piobst = 100(pi + pˆit),
robst = 100(r + rˆt),
robsL,t = 100(rL + rˆL,t), and
Bratio,obst =
PLB
L
z
Bz
(1 + PˆL,t + Bˆ
L
z,t − Bˆz,t),
where all state variables are in deviations from their steady state values, pi ≡ ln(Π),
r ≡ ln(R), and rL ≡ ln(RL).
We construct real GDP by dividing the nominal GDP series by population and
the GDP deflator. The observable ∆Y obst corresponds to the first difference in logs of
this series, multiplied by 100. We measure the labor input by the log of hours of all
persons in the non-farm business sector divided by population. Real wages correspond
to nominal compensation per hour in the non-farm business sector, divided by the
GDP deflator. As for GDP, ∆wobst is the first difference in logs of this series, multiplied
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by 100. The quarterly log-difference in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE)
core price index is our measure of inflation. We use the effective Federal Funds Rate as
our measure of nominal short-term rate and the 10-year Treasury constant maturity
rate as our measure of nominal long-term interest rate. Finally, we identify long-term
bonds as U.S. Treasury securities with maturity greater than one year, consistent
with the announcement of LSAP II, and construct the ratio to short-term bonds as
our measure for the quantity of debt.
A.6 Implementing the Commitment to the Zero
Lower Bound
In this section we describe how we implement the commitment to the zero lower
bound. This same approach is also used to guarantee that none of simulation paths
violates the non-negative interest rate constraint.
A.6.1 Canonical model
Consider the economic model in its canonical form, as in Sims (2002):
Γ
s(t)
4 (θ) zt = Γ¯
s(t)
0 + Γ
s(t)
1 (θ) zt−1 + Γ
s(t)
2 (θ) εt + Γ
s(t)
3 (θ) ηt (A.127)
where s (t) ∈ {n, zlb} refers to the state of the economy, with n referring to nor-
mal times and zlb for times of in which the zero lower bound is binding; zt is the
vector of state variables, whether they are endogenous or exogenous; εt is a vector
of exogenous i.i.d. innovations; ηt is a vector of endogenous expectational errors;
and
{
Γ
s(t)
ι (θ)
}
ι=0,1,2,3,4
are matrices defining the state space for any given vector of
parameters θ.
130
For simplification of notation, below I will omit the reference to the vector of
parameters when writing the matrices.
With some restrictions it is possible to break the system in (A.127) into two blocks:
a forward looking one and a backward looking one. So for each equation we can write:
j ∈ FL : Γs(t)4 (j)Etzt+1 = Γs(t)0 (j) + Γs(t)1 (j) zt (A.128)
i ∈ BL : Γs(t)4 (i) zt = Γs(t)0 (i) + Γs(t)1 (i) zt−1 + Γs(t)2 (i) εt (A.129)
where i denotes BL equations and j the FL ones.
A.6.2 Perfect Foresight Solution Method
Consider a sequence of periods {s (t)}Kt=0 such that for t > K we have s (t) = n and
εt = 0 — i.e. n eventually becomes an absorbing state and no additional innovations
are expected beyond K. In this case we can solve for the REE solution backwards.
Absorbing state
In normal times, for t > K, the REE solution can be represented by
zt = Φ
n
0 + Φ
n
1zt−1 + Φ
n
2εt (A.130)
Before the absorbing state
We need to solve for the REE matrices recursively.
Notice first that for the last period before the absorbing state kicks in, and using
(A.130), we can write the forward looking component of the system as
Γ
s(t)
4 (j)Et [Φ
n
0 + Φ
n
1zt + Φ
n
2εt+1] = Γ
s(t)
0 (j) + Γ
s(t)
1 (j) zt
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which we can rewrite as
[
Γ
s(t)
4 (j) Φ
n
1 − Γs(t)1 (j)
]
zt = Γ
s(t)
0 (j)− Γs(t)4 (j) [Φn0 + Φn2 εˆt+1]
and combine this with the backward looking to get the full system written as
Γ˜4 (t) zt = Γ˜0 (t) + Γ˜1 (t) zt−1 + Γ˜2 (t) εt (A.131)
with
Γ˜4 (t) ≡
 Γs(t)4 (j) Φ1 (t+ 1)− Γs(t)1 (j)
Γ
s(t)
4 (i)
 , (A.132)
Γ˜0 (t) ≡
 Γs(t)0 (j)− Γs(t)4 (j) [Φ0 (t+ 1) + Φn2 (t+ 1) εˆt+1]
Γ
s(t)
0 (i)
 , (A.133)
Γ˜ι (t) ≡
 0
Γ
s(t)
ι (i)
 , for ι = 1, 2, (A.134)
and
Φι (t+ 1) = Φ
n
ι , for t = K and ι = 0, 1. (A.135)
Now we can solve this system for zt and write
zt = Φ0 (t) + Φ1 (t) zt−1 + Φ2 (t) εt (A.136)
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with
Φ0 (t) ≡
[
Γ˜4 (t)
]−1
Γ˜0 (t) , (A.137)
Φ1 (t) ≡
[
Γ˜4 (t)
]−1
Γ˜1 (t) , (A.138)
Φ2 (t) ≡
[
Γ˜4 (t)
]−1
Γ˜2 (t) (A.139)
and notice that we need to use a pseudo inverse, to account for the fact that Γ˜4 (t)
might not be invertible.
Notice that (A.136) is in the exact same form of (A.130). So, iterating backwards,
the system (A.131) and the REE solution (A.136) are valid for ∀t ≤ K.
A.6.3 Implementing the ZLB commitment
We use the convention in our simulations that period t = 0 is the period in which
LSAP is announced and implementation started, and the commitment to the zero
lower bound applies to the first four periods, including period t = 0. Given the
framework just described, then implementing the commitment to the ZLB implies
setting a sequence of states {s (t)}Kt=0 such that st = zlb for t = 0, 1, 2, 3 and st = n
for t > 3. Then iterate backwards, starting in period 3 towards the initial period
to find the REE solution matrices for periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3. For periods t > 3 the
solution is the usual one in the absence of policy regime change.
For the zlb regime we have exactly the same equations as in regime n, but replace
the interest rate rule equation with one setting the interest rate to zero.
A.6.4 Enforcing Non-Negative Interest Rate
We can also use this same framework to enforce the non-negative interest rate con-
straint after the commitment to the zero lower bound is lifted. This is relevant because
133
for some parameter draws we get this constraint to be violated. In order to accomplish
this we use a guess and verify approach.
In the first step we make the simulation under the assumption that the sequence
of states {s (t)}Kt=0 is the one described above. Then we check for any violations of
the non-negative interest rate constraint and switch the regime for those periods from
n to zlb, and solve again for the solution. We keep doing this until there are no
violations.
A.7 Robustness
This section considers four robustness exercises. First, we consider the implications
of extending the duration of the LSAP program. Second, we consider a longer com-
mitment to the zero lower bound by the monetary authority. Third, we ask how
sensitive the model is to the degree of market segmentation. Fourth, we study the
role of nominal rigidities.
The first two robustness check has obvious policy interest and implications. The
motivation for the other two exercises is that the financial crisis may have introduced
a (possibly temporary) change in regime, both in the financial market structure and
in the price setting mechanism. Ideally, we could capture these phenomena with a
regime-switching model. Beside the technical complications, the main limitation of
this approach is that the change in regime is probably one of a kind and occurred
at the very end of the sample. As such, regime-switching techniques may not have
enough data to identify the change in the economic environment. The less formal
robustness analysis presented here is still informative to document this point, while
research on this is left for future work.
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A.7.1 The Role of the Length of LSAP Programs
In our baseline simulation, the central bank accumulates assets over four quarters and
holds the balance sheet constant for the next two years, before gradually winding down
the program over two additional years. This assumption is fairly arbitrary. Depend-
ing on economic conditions, policy makers may change the length of the programs,
as the recent U.S. and U.K. experience suggests. Without undertaking an exhaus-
tive analysis, this subsection considers one alternative path: the central bank still
accumulates assets over the first year (as per the FOMC announcement in November
2010) but then holds the balance-sheet constant for four years, instead of two, before
gradually exiting. Figure A.1 shows the corresponding responses, in the same format
as the figures show in the paper, with red continuous line for the this simulation, with
grey shaded regions representing the uncertainty and the dashed blue line showing
the baseline simulation effects for easy comparison.
Not surprisingly, this change in the time profile of the asset holdings by the central
bank induces a stronger response by the risk premium, with a median peak response
of -16 bp (instead of -11 bp). As a result, output and inflation respond more strongly.
However, while the inflation response roughly doubles compared to the baseline sce-
nario (median response at the peak of 0.059%, compared to 0.031%), the response of
output is only 50% stronger (median response of 0.19%, instead of 0.13%, for GDP
growth). Not surprisingly, the uncertainty around the median is larger, with the 95th
percentiles increasing proportionally.
In sum, if the central bank holds the purchased assets for longer, the stimulative
impact on output and inflation increases and becomes more persistent. Moreover, the
additional boost is stronger for inflation than for output. Nominal rigidities play an
important role in this respect. Because the shock lasts longer, more firms and workers
are expected to change their prices and wages over time, which in turn leads the firms
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and workers who can change their prices and wages early to do so more aggressively.
A.7.2 The Role of the Length of the ZLB Commitment
In the paper we discuss how important is the commitment of the central bank to
keep the interest rate at zero to boost the effects of the LSAP program. Here we
take that analysis one step further by considering a longer commitment. Instead
of four quarters, we consider five quarters of commitment. Figure A.4 shows the
corresponding responses, in the same format as the previous figure.
The figure gives a strong message: adding just one more quarter to the commit-
ment gives a powerful boost to the effects of LSAP. GDP growth increases on impact
by 0.22% (instead of 0.13%) and inflation increases by 0.045% instead of 0.031. So the
effects on the real economy are stronger by a magnitude between 50% and 70%, de-
pending on the variable considered. This means that the effects of additional quarters
of commitment to the ZLB are highly non-linear, due to the power of the expectations
channel. As a result skewness also increases.
This result also confirms the importance of looking at the effects of interest rate
policy and asset purchases in combination. They interact with each other and thus
can and should be used in a coordinated fashion.
A.7.3 The Role of Market Segmentation
The baseline experiment suggests that the effects of LSAP II are fairly modest on GDP
and quite small on inflation. One reason why our results may underestimate the effects
of asset purchase programs is that the degree of financial market segmentation may
have recently increased due to the financial crisis.59 As discussed earlier, our reduced-
59Baumeister and Benati (2010) estimate a VAR with time-varying coefficients and stochastic
volatility to account for this type of effects, on top of other changes in the structural relations
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form friction for market segmentation aims at capturing a combination of preferences
for certain asset classes and institutional restrictions on the type of investments certain
financial intermediaries undertake. By shifting the true and perceived distribution of
risk, the financial crisis may have induced a fraction of investors previously active in
multiple segments of financial markets to concentrate on one particular asset class.
For this purpose, we repeat the baseline experiment in the presence of a high
degree of market segmentation. Figure A.2 shows the results of the same simulated
LSAP II experiment as in the baseline case. The difference is that, in this case, we
only draw from the lower half of the posterior distribution of the parameter ωu. All
other parameters are drawn from the same posterior distribution as before.60
The median responses of GDP growth and inflation with the ZLB commitment
are about 50% bigger than in the baseline case, at +0.21% and +0.044% respectively
(compared to 0.13% and 0.031%). Upside posterior uncertainty is now more pro-
nounced. The 95th percentile now nearly reaches 1% for GDP growth and 0.2% for
inflation, compared to 0.6% and 0.15% before. The stronger response of macroeco-
nomic variables requires the central bank to increase the short-term nominal interest
rate by two additional basis points. As a consequence, given that the drop in the risk
premium is the same, long-term rates decrease one basis point less.
The bottom line from this exercise is that allowing for a higher degree of seg-
mentation does increase the response of GDP growth and inflation to the stimulus of
asset purchase programs. However, unless segmentation becomes really extreme, the
macroeconomic effects of LSAP remain quite small, especially for inflation.
among macroeconomic variables potentially triggered by the financial crisis.
60To be precise, this is a counterfactual simulation. As for the main simulations, we draw a
parameter vector from the MCMC posterior sample. However, we then perform a resample exercise
for the ωu parameter in which we extract the marginal sample for this parameter, perform an
ascending ordering and keep only the lower half of it. Then, for each parameter vector used in the
simulation, we draw independently the ωu parameter value from this modified subsample.
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A.7.4 The Role of Nominal Rigidities
One reason for the small response of inflation to LSAP II is that the estimated degree
of nominal rigidities, especially for prices, is quite high. While our priors for the
probability of holding prices and wages fixed in any given period (ζp and ζw) are
both centered at 0.5, the posterior medians for the two parameters are 0.93 and 0.73,
respectively.
A high degree of stickiness in prices and wages is not an uncommon finding in the
DSGE literature, especially in the absence of real rigidities like in our case (Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2008)). Additionally, Hall (2011) has recently emphasized how prices
have failed to fall substantially in the last recession. As in the case of segmentation,
the financial crisis may have caused a structural change in the price setting process
that the model interprets as an increase in price rigidities (the same consideration
applies to wages).61.
Nevertheless, we want to quantify the sensitivity of our results to a lower degree of
nominal rigidities, more in line with standard values from the empirical literature that
uses micro data (e.g. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010)). Figure A.3 shows the results
of the baseline LSAP II experiment when we fix ζp at 0.75, more in line with the
recent empirical evidence. All other parameters are drawn from the same posterior
distribution as before.
The figure shows that nominal rigidities play an important quantitative role in the
response of inflation to asset purchases. When prices are more flexible, the median
response of inflation to LSAP II on impact is more than twice bigger than when
we use the estimated posterior distribution. The counterparts are a less persistent
inflation process and a slightly smaller effect on GDP growth. Notice that the effects
61Indeed, if we consider a sample that ends before the recent crisis (second quarter of 2007), the
posterior median for ζp is somewhat smaller
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on the GDP level are now considerably smaller and less persistent. In equilibrium
(i.e., taking into account the endogenous response of monetary policy), the two effects
roughly compensate each other. The increase in the short-term interest rates is almost
the same in the two cases. Therefore, also the behavior of long-term rates is very
similar. The increase in upside uncertainty for inflation is roughly proportional to
the changes in the median. The 95th percentile of the response in inflation is 0.4%,
compared to just above 0.15% in the baseline experiment.
In sum, higher price flexibility shifts the adjustment in response to asset purchase
programs from GDP growth to inflation, by making its process more front-loaded.
A.8 Diagnostics
This section provides more detailed analysis of the empirical diagnostics for the model.
As stated in the main text of the paper, since we include the long-term bond as an
observable, switching on all the shocks, we should match the short rate and long
rate perfectly. In order to evaluate how the model performs empirically, we want to
compare the model generated moments with those of the data. The rest of this section,
we will analyze variance, variance decomposition and historical shock decomposition
in turn.
A.8.1 Variance
In this section we compare the variance of each variable in the data with that pre-
dicted by our model. For the model variance we compute for each parameter draw
the unconditional variance of the relevant state variable and then take the median
across draws. We focus on the short-term interest rate and long-term interest rate
for this model diagnostics exercise. The model’s unconditional variance for the short
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rate is 0.44, which is just above half of that observed in the data (0.81) while the
model’s unconditional variance for the long rate is 0.12,which is only one fourth of
that observed in the data (0.47). This model does a decent job in terms of explaining
the variance of the ratio of the long bond to the short bond. (the data variance is 0.08
and the unconditional model variance is 0.07) This suggests that this model has a
limited ability to match properties of the yield curve in the data. However, our main
purpose is not to explain yield curve shape or dynamics, rather, we are interested in
analyzing how changes in the risk premium affect macroeconomy and the monetary
transmission mechanism of the Fed’s unconventional policy.
A.8.2 Variance Decomposition
Here we compare the relative importance of different shocks in determining some of the
variables of interest, from an unconditional perspective. Table A.1 shows the median
percentage contribution of each shock to the unconditional variance of some variables
of interest. Figures A.5 through A.7 show the variance decomposition at different
forecasting horizons for the FFR, long yield and slope of the yield curve. Yield curve
slope is defined as the difference between the long and short rate rLt − rt. For the
definition of risk premium and the long rate implied by the expectation hypothesis,
see section A.1.6.
The marginal efficiency of the investment shock (µ) is the single most important
factor in determining the short rate at the business cycle frequencies, which is con-
sistent with the findings in Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2011). In the very
short run (less than 2 years) the short rate is also somewhat influenced by the pol-
icy shocks. Preference shock (shock to the discount factor) becomes relatively more
important to the short rate in the medium to long run, climbing to as much as 19%.
On the contrary, shock to the risk premium is the most important driver for the
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long yield volatility, accounting for 64% in the short run and 39% in the long run. In
second place come the shock to the discount factor (ranges between 13% and 24%)
and the shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (ranges between 13% and 22%).
Productivity shock accounts for very little in the short run (3%) but rises to 9% in
the long run.
The largest contributor to the volatility of the slope of the yield curve is the
monetary policy shock. On impact it accounts for 57% and decays to only 7% in the
long run. The risk premium shock accounts for as much as 42% 2 to 3 quarters ahead,
and keeps its important role throughout by fluctuating around 30%, depending on the
horizon. The shock to the marginal efficiency of investment has a more limited role
in the short run but becomes the single most important driver for the volatility of the
yield curve slope over the medium and long run, accounting for more than 50% for
horizons of 8 quarters and longer. Discount factor shock plays a more or less residual
role, and contributes mostly in the long run, reaching eventually 6%.
If we look at the expectations hypothesis component then the contributions are
similar to the long rate, but now the contribution of the shock to the risk premium
is smaller, as expected. The only reason the risk premium shock even shows up here
is due to the real effects and the endogenous response of the economy and monetary
policy to the shock to the risk premium.
A.8.3 Historical Shock Decomposition
In this exercise, we use a disturbance smoother (as described in Carter and Kohn
(1994)) to recover draws for the historical paths of the shocks. We then feed these
shocks to the model, one at a time, to generate the counterfactual path of each
variable, which gives us the marginal contribution of each shock to the evolution of
each variable at each point in the sample. We show the median across parameter
141
draws. Figures A.9 through A.18 show select contributions of shocks to the yield
curve related variables. The black line shows the median estimated path for the
variable under consideration and the vertical bars show the marginal contribution of
each shock in each period in time to that variable’s path.
In terms of the short rate, Figure A.8 shows that shock to the risk premium has
been pushing the FFR down since 1994 by 2 to 3 percentage points. Interestingly Fig-
ure A.9 demonstrates that monetary policy shock has been pushing the FFR up since
2007. This means that the recent low interest rates are more likely to be explained
by the economic conditions, as opposed to being artificially low due to discretionary
policy decisions. As Figure A.10 shows, the marginal efficiency of investment, the key
factor in the unconditional analysis, captures fairly well the cyclical movements in
the FFR except the early 90s and the recent period of time. Finally, the productivity
shock has been pushing the FFR down since the beginning of 2000.
In the 1990s the risk premium shock (Figure A.11) contributes heavily to the
movements in the long rate, and was compensated down by other shocks. In the
most recent period leading to 2009, the risk premium contributes to increase in the
long rate, with help from the increasing ratio of long term debt in the hands of the
public. (Also see Figure A.12 for the long-term bond supply shock). On the other
hand, Figure A.13 shows that the shock to the discount factor has been pushing the
long rate down at the end of the sample. Similarly Figure A.14 demonstrates the
productivity has been pushing down the long yield.
The volatility of the slope of the yield curve is mostly explained by the evolution
of the risk premium shock. (Figure A.15) At the end of the sample the risk premium
shock is pushing the slope up, helped a bit by the shock to the discount factor and
the shock to the long term bond supply that increases the ratio of the long debt to
the short debt in the hands of the public. However the effects are countered by the
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negative contributions by the monetary policy shock and the shock to the marginal
efficiency of investment. (See Figure A.16 Figure A.17 and Figure A.18)
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Table A.1: Variance decomposition for short and long rates, slope of the yield curve,
risk premium component of the slope and expectations hypothesis component of the
long rate. For each variable the table shows the median marginal contribution of each
shock to the unconditional variance of that variable, shown in percentage points.
short rate long rate slope risk premium long rate (EH)
productivity (εz) 4.8 9.4 1.4 0.1 12.2
markup (ελ) 0.2 0 0.2 0 0
investment (εµ) 58.4 21.7 52.3 0.1 31.6
discount factor (εb) 1.8 0.5 1.5 0 0.7
labor supply (εφ) 18.8 24 5.6 0.1 30.8
long bond supply (εBL) 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2
tax (εT ) 0.0 0 0 0 0
monetary policy (εm) 0.6 1.2 6.9 0 1.6
risk premium (εζ) 5.7 38.6 29.1 98.8 15.7
government spending (εg) 0.1 0 0 0 0
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Figure A.1: Responses to simulated shock to market value of long-term debt (as shown
in Figure 1 in chapter 1) in the case in which the central bank keeps the purchased
assets for four years (instead of two). All responses are in annualized percentage rates
(except the output level, shown in percentage deviations from the path in the absence
of the shock). The continuous red line corresponds to the posterior median response
and the grey shades to different posterior probability intervals (50, 60, 70, 80 and 90
percent, from darker to lighter shading). The dashed blue line is the posterior median
response of the variables in the baseline simulation, shown in Figure 3 in the paper.
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Figure A.2: Responses to simulated shock to market value of long-term debt (shown
in Figure 1 in chapter 1) in the presence of a high degree of market segmentation (by
considering the lower half of the distribution of ωu). All responses are in annualized
percentage rates (except the output level, shown in percentage deviations from the
path in the absence of the shock). The continuous red line corresponds to the posterior
median response and the grey shades to different posterior probability intervals (50,
60, 70, 80 and 90 percent, from darker to lighter shading). The dashed blue line is
the posterior median response of the variables in the baseline simulation, shown in
Figure 3 in the paper.
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Figure A.3: Responses to simulated shock to market value of long-term debt (shown in
Figure 1 in chapter 1) in the presence of lower price rigidities (ζp = 0.75). All responses
are in annualized percentage rates (except the output level, shown in percentage
deviations from the path in the absence of the shock). The continuous red line
corresponds to the posterior median response and the grey shades to different posterior
probability intervals (50, 60, 70, 80 and 90 percent, from darker to lighter shading).
The dashed blue line is the posterior median response of the variables in the baseline
simulation, shown in Figure 3 in the paper.
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Figure A.4: Responses to simulated shock to market value of long-term debt (shown
in Figure 1 in chapter 1) in the case in which the central bank keeps ZLB for five
quarters (instead of four). All responses are in annualized percentage rates (except
the output level, shown in percentage deviations from the path in the absence of the
shock). The continuous red line corresponds to the posterior median response and the
grey shades to different posterior probability intervals (50, 60, 70, 80 and 90 percent,
from darker to lighter shading). The dashed blue line is the posterior median response
of the variables in the baseline simulation, shown in Figure 3 in the paper.
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Figure A.5: Variance decomposition for the FFR at different horizons.
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Figure A.6: Variance decomposition for the long yield at different horizons.
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Figure A.7: Variance decomposition for the yield curve slope at different horizons.
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Figure A.8: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to the risk
premium to path of the short rate.
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Figure A.9: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to monetary
policy rule to the short rate.
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Figure A.10: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the the shock to the
marginal efficiency of investment to the path of the short rate.
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Figure A.11: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to the risk
premium to the long rate.
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Figure A.12: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to long bond
supply to the path of the long rate
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Figure A.13: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to the dis-
count factor to the path of the long rate.
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Figure A.14: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the productivity shock
to the path of the long rate.
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Figure A.15: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to risk pre-
mium to the path of the slope of the yield curve.
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Figure A.16: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to the dis-
count factor to the path of the slope of the yield curve.
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Figure A.17: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to monetary
policy to the path of the slope of the yield curve.
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Figure A.18: Historical shock decomposition: contribution of the shock to marginal
efficiency of investment the slope of the yield curve.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2: Proof that
Schorfheide (2005) and Liu,
Waggoner, and Zha (2011) give
rise to the same solution
This section assumes that the only regime-switching parameter is the target steady
state interest rate. Schorfheide (2005) implies:
Rˆt = ρRRˆt−1 + (1− ρR)ϕpipˆit + (1− ρR)ϕyyˆt + εR,t + (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi) Rˆ∗t
= ρRRˆt−1 + (1− ρR)ϕpipˆit + (1− ρR)ϕyyˆt + ε∗R,t,
where
ε∗R,t = εR,t + (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
eˆs,t.
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Solution by gensys can be written as below where I assume the first shock is ε∗R,t :
yt = Θ1yt−1 + Θ0zt + Θy
∞∑
s=1
ΘsfΘzEtzt+s
= Θ1yt−1 + Θ0zt + (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi) Θy
∞∑
s=1
ΘsfΘz

1
0
0

[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
P s.
So the constant is
Θc (Kt) = (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi) Θ0·1 ·
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
es,t
= (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi) Θy
∞∑
s=1
ΘsfΘz

1
0
0

[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
P ses,t.
Now I will prove that Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) give rise to the same solution.
Assuming the first row of the equilibrium conditions is for the Federal Funds Rate:

Γ0,

− (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...

0 . . . , I2

 yt
eˆs,t

=
 Γ1 0
0 P

 yt−1
eˆs,t−1
+
 Ψ 0
0 I2

 zt
νt
+
 Πηt
0
 .
Perform QZ decomposition on Γ0 and Γ1 and then premultiply both sides by
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 Q 0
0 I2
 :
 Qnxn 0
0 I2


Q′ΛZ ′,

− (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...

nx2
[0]2xn . . . , I2

 yt
eˆs,t

=
 Qnxn 0
0 I2
 Q′ΩZ ′ 0
0 P
 yt−1
eˆs,t−1
+
 Qnxn 0
0 I2
 Ψ 0
0 I2
 zt
νt
+
 Πηt
0
 ,
and thus:

ΛZ ′ Q

− (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...

0 I2

 yt
eˆs,t
 (B.1)
=
 ΩZ ′ 0
0 P

 yt−1
eˆs,t−1
+
 QΨ 0
0 I2

 zt
νt
+
 QΠηt
0
 .
Let wt = Z
′yt, and wt−1 = Z ′yt−1. B.1 becomes:
Λwt +Q

− (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t
= Ωwt−1 +QΨzt +QΠηt,
and thus:
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 Λ11 Λ12
0 Λ22
 w1 (t)
w2 (t)
−Q


(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t + Ψzt + Πηt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
xt
=
 Ω11 Ω12
0 Ω22
 w1 (t− 1)
w2 (t− 1)
 .
Let M = Ω−122 Λ22 and solve forward:
w2 (t) = −Et
[ ∞∑
s=1
M s−1Ω−122 x2 (t+ s)
]
= −
[ ∞∑
s=1
M s−1Ω−122 x2 (t+ s)
]
.
Replace xt with their definition and use the fact Etηt+s = 0 :
= −Et

∞∑
s=1
Ms−1Ω−122 Q2·
ΨZt+s +

(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t+s


= −

∞∑
s=1
Ms−1Ω−122 Q2·
ΨZt+s +

(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t+s + Πηt+s

 ,
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and thus:
Q2·Πηt+1 =
∞∑
s=1
Ω22M
s−1Ω−122 Q2· (Ψ (Et+1zt+s − Etzt+s))
+
∞∑
s=1
Ω22M
s−1Ω−122 Q2·


(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 (Et+1eˆs,t+s − Eteˆs,t+s)
 .
If the solution is unique:
Q1·Π = ΦQ2·Π.
Premultiplying B.2 by [I − Φ] :
 Λ11 Λ12 − ΦΛ22
0 I

 w1 (t)
w2 (t)

−
 Q1· − ΦQ2·
0



(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t

=
 Ω11 Ω12 − ΦΩ22
0 0

 w1 (t− 1)
w2 (t− 1)
+
 Q1· − ΦQ2·
0
Ψzt
−
 0
Et
[∑∞
s=1 M
s−1Ω−122 x2 (t+ s)
]
 .
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Finally,
yt+Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
 Q1· − ΦQ2·
0


− (1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t
= Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
 Ω11 Ω12 − ΦΩ22
0 0
Z ′yt−1
+ Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
 Q1· − ΦQ2·
0
Ψzt
− Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
 0
Et
[∑∞
s=1M
s−1Ω−122 Q2·Ψzt+s
]

− Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
 ·

0
Et
∑∞s=1Ms−1Ω−122 Q2·

(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t+s


.
By simplifying notation, I can rewrite the above equation as:
yt = Θ1yt−1 + Θ0
Ψzt +

(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t

+ Θy
∞∑
s=1
Θs−1f ΘzEt
Ψzt+s +

(1− ρR) (1− ϕpi)
[
log
(
R1
R
)
, log
(
R2
R
)]
0
...
 eˆs,t+s
 ,
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where
Θ1 = Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I

 Ω11 Ω12 − ΦΩ22
0 0
Z ′,
Θ0 = Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I

 Q1· − ΦQ2·
0
 ,
Θy = −Z
 Λ−111 Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
 ,
Θf = M,
and
Θz = Ω
−1
22 Q2·.
This is exactly the same as treating eˆs,t+s as a shock as in Schorfheide (2005). 
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